it was not so complex that it went right over your head
, i meant to say that even Agni V has not yet tested for its full range. I guess just 3000-3500 which is (if i believe experts here) just half of its range.India - Pakistan Standoff 2019
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, i meant to say that even Agni V has not yet tested for its full range. I guess just 3000-3500 which is (if i believe experts here) just half of its range.
Any how things are cooling up on military front. Both side the CFV have reduced, as the winter is approaching and on the diplomatic side well it will be 1000 years ongoing efforts.
I think Mods can now close this thread temporarily till there is some misshapen in Kashmir and India and Pakistan do some surgical strike for public consumption on both sides. And rest fight eachother on twitter.
Welcome to new era.
My conclusion: India has already responded to what Pakistan did on 27th Feb by removing A370 which was very much on cards. I had repeatedly made statements that there will not be any skirmish further.
I think Mods can now close this thread temporarily till there is some misshapen in Kashmir and India and Pakistan do some surgical strike for public consumption on both sides. And rest fight eachother on twitter.
Welcome to new era.
My conclusion: India has already responded to what Pakistan did on 27th Feb by removing A370 which was very much on cards. I had repeatedly made statements that there will not be any skirmish further.
For the external front, India's abrogation of statehood for J&K could be thought of as a strategic riposte to events of Feb 27.
However internally, particularly for the tri services rivalry and the intra & inter services politics it's far from settled. Infact the powerplays have barely even begun. The senior officers and formations responsible for air ops in Northern Sector will be made to pay a price for their incompetence, both by MoD and the Air Force hierarchy while the sister services extracts their own pound of flesh from the air Force as a whole for this display.
People who've never served generally aren't priby to this, but within the fighting forces there exists a sort of informal hierarchy of respect and confidence. It goes for everyone, the soldiers, the officers, the formations. There are certain formations and commanders the high command will turn to, to resolve critical crisis. They have earned that respect and confidence through their actions, demonstrated in key situations. Conversely there are also formations that aren't trusted much. Nobody will name them as such openly, for even they fight bravely. But their failure to achieve objectives assigned to them in the past weighs very heavily against them in this system of informal "izzat". Once you go down this hierarchy, you know you're marked. No two ways about it. You're ostracized from your own tribe.
To name an example, if you're a commander under whom a major terror attack occurs on bases commanded by you, your career is unofficially over. The confidence extended to you is now withdrawn. The commander of URI in 2016 is an example. In the eyes of his peers and seniors, he is a failure, even though he didn't exactly do anything wrong, not anymore than other commanders had done. The brigade and the regiments however was given the chance to redeem it's pride in the consequently surgical strikes. Yet the mark remains. It was this brigade that failed. Kargil conflict is another example. 121 brigade ( if I recall correctly) and it's commander lost its reputation almost entirely due to their conduct. Nearly all officers of the brigade bore that scar till they retired.
The IAF senior officers responsible for Northern Sector will have to pay the price of their unprofessionalism. The clamour for their heads will grow in time as the situation with Pak de-escalates. Meanwhile the IAF senior brass will have their work cut out. Several senior MoD bureaucrats have lost confidence in IAF post 27th Feb performance. Not to mention IA and IN are right there, waiting to take advantage of any opportunity that arises due to perceived weakness. Budgets can be moved, Allocations changed. Infact politics over this will affect the decision of CDS, wherein IAF will struggle to get its own nominated for sometime due to the stain of this one day.
consequences for IAf didn't just end with Abhinandan on 27th Feb.
If I recall correctly, IAF was the biggest roadblock to the implementation of the theater commands. Also among the 3 services, the IAF was and remains the most inflexible one when it comes to sharing of resources. There are of course other problems like ownership of aerial assets, a recent example of the same would be the induction of Apaches in the IAF instead of the IA.
When it comes to budget IA and IAF gets the lions share and IN gets peanuts, IN on the other hand is argueably the most efficient of them all. Although the near constant delays in shipbuilding leaves much to be desired. But at least they aren't importing everything like the other two.
A bit of weakness in the IAF might not to be that bad, especially if it allows the MoD to somehow fix the persistent problems. But I doubt they will, as always we will continue on with our "chalta hai" attitude.
You have give a great insight to a very serious issue. I thank you for this.
How are we going to deal with such incompetency in IAF or any other military service? Is training an issue as well? Especially at the mindset and psychological level.
Incompetency means life and territory both lost. Was this not known to the political leadership or it was already a fact known and which every time stopped us in taking action because airforce was not ready? Would I be correct if I say, we stopped after 27th because IAF's competency and capability to defend or strike punitively and TIMELY was not there.
How would China see our airforce, have we exposed ourselves to the stronger forces? Is Indian airforce ready for two theater confrontation? Or the Navy air arm and Army air wing will be allocated more budgets to establish their own air operation units?
How are we going to deal with such incompetency in IAF or any other military service? Is training an issue as well? Especially at the mindset and psychological level.
Incompetency means life and territory both lost. Was this not known to the political leadership or it was already a fact known and which every time stopped us in taking action because airforce was not ready? Would I be correct if I say, we stopped after 27th because IAF's competency and capability to defend or strike punitively and TIMELY was not there.
How would China see our airforce, have we exposed ourselves to the stronger forces? Is Indian airforce ready for two theater confrontation? Or the Navy air arm and Army air wing will be allocated more budgets to establish their own air operation units?
Indian Navy is relatively better because of very weak PN.
But of course strength begets strength.
They are moving from strength to strength.
Limited budget makes them smarter with preferences.
But if budgets isn't given adequately deficit will be felt.
Have we ordered NMRH helis?
But IN is prone to sabotages and infiltration. It's assets's capability would be compromised before they are deployed if they securit is not monitored properly.
They are , rather IAF has been totally sabotaged, 'delays and unpreparednes' is a part of that. This shouldn't happen with IN so it requires a vigil.
Nope. The Pakistani govt. has denied the story, but a lot of Indian media are putting it up. I have nothing else.
When you think of leaders of Muslim world it's Saudi Arabia that is mostly taken seriously by west and assigned that role. They also have religious superiority over relatively lower class recently converted Muslims of subcontinent.
Now when beggars tries to take that role away that too with Turkey which created endless problems for MBS, how do you think King or crown Prince react?
And I wont be surprized if that Pakistani Gen of the Arab alliance resigns soon.
Again, only speculation from your side.
Man, you sure only read your own posts, don't you? And per chance you read someone else's you will still revert to your own view!
Have stated three times earlier too, a use of nuke by Pakistan does not necessarily mean that we will use one, does not mean we will keep it limited to similar yield and certainly does not mean we will give a massive strike across the board.
The conflict has to be managed and resolved.
The incompetency remark is specific to the conduct of senior command at the helm of ops centre, Northern operations during the crisis. It is not meant to tar or question any other service personnel in any of the tri servies.
As far as training and capability is concerned, right after the Skirmish the IAF began a massive internal review of the whole event. It involved a deep dive into every single element of the IAF operations and PAF actions. TACDE, alongwith EW/ECM specialists were directly involved in evaluating all aspects of the air ops. GCI, the ops centre, the pilots, EW asset operators involved, everyones testimonies were collected and analyzed in depth. Evidence, electronic sensor data onboard ground assets, airborne asses, communication recordings, decision tracks, everything was basically packed wholesale and taken for analysis. Even ground crew of the airbases were questioned on certain specific issues. To give a scale of the review, the entire event was recreated and every second of the exchange was walked though in detail, with every actors's decisions at each moment analysed. Emphasis was laid on command decisions, equipment performance (particularly wrt EW/ECM) and combat manuevres. The broad level changes to doctrines including but not limited to equipment purhases we've been privy to in recent months is the outcome of this massive review. Additional changes are expected, not all recommendations have been adhered to yet, from what I understand.
I'm not privy to the report, only aware of certain points. However, I would not be surprised if certain senior members here have had a chance to peruse it.
The first point relates to the assumption that PAF would not fire BVRAAMs from their side of the LOC. The expectation since always was that they'd bait IAF aircraft into POK and try to execute a shoot down on their side. ROEs were formulated accordingly. Note: These were not new ROEs. Once the Radar controllers and Su drivers began to confirm that BVRAAMS were indeed launched across the LOC, the command went into a shell, not providing new ROEs to fighter crews who were by now caught up in engagement. Void of new ROEs and PAF ACs staying well within POK, GCI was constrained into asking IAF ACs into defensive positions.
ROEs now have apparently been changed. LOC is no longer sanctified. PAF is aware of this. Thus the attempt by them to avoid closing in onto the LOC post 27Th Feb. It's one card they knew they'd only be able to play once. Now nothing stops IAF from tossing BVRs across the LOC. Expect PAF to request that both sides revert to old ROEs soon, given Indian dominance in Air surveillence capabilities.
The next point relates to Su-30MKI & R-27/77 combo being outranged in a heavy EW environment. Why was this scenario not wargammed beforehand? The intensive exercises and exchanges with IsAF, SgAF and even IAFs own evaluation of F-16 block 60 and AMRAAM AIM 120D/C-7 should have provided adequate information regarding the capabilities of this mix. In fact there is little doubt that key individuals knew about it. There should be volumes on this. The question is why was it not taken into consideration? Was the information classified? Was this information not included in upskilling Su Drivers?
That is a case even on a fine day, the problems of communications over certain distances, especially in line of sight, which is what the majority of communications will entail.
Yes and no. The dissipation of ionized particles will be dependent on the air currents prevalent. At the required height that shall result in zero radioactive fallout and create nil NIGA and be a pure EMP emitter over the battlespace, the winds are quite turbulent and have greater circulation over the South Asian region.
At Tactical level we have CRN (Combat Radio Network). It is encrypted, frequency hopping and depends on line of sight. We are not very dependent on HX sets
The negotiations broke down after MoD wanted more time and Airbus refused to not increase the price.
A new AoN has been granted and the procedure will start all over again.
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