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For the CG helos ? We can't do anything right. Not one single acquisition without these problems.
Airbus provided an extension in 2017 I think. MoD was seeking another extension till jan 2020 I think. But Airbus said that for a small order of 14 choppers and already stringent offset conditions, it ain't possible.
 
Airbus provided an extension in 2017 I think. MoD was seeking another extension till jan 2020 I think. But Airbus said that for a small order of 14 choppers and already stringent offset conditions, it ain't possible.
The MoD could've just bundled up both the CG helos and the NMRH together and chosen to acquire the same helo for both the services. Would've saved us all the trouble. But then we are stupid.
 
Bdw ...there was a test recently in itr chandipur ....which not in media ..
A missile test ,I heard ...can anyone confirm

And now India is confident means ...at least first phase of bmd is activated
 
The next point relates to Su-30MKI & R-27/77 combo being outranged in a heavy EW environment. Why was this scenario not wargammed beforehand? The intensive exercises and exchanges with IsAF, SgAF and even IAFs own evaluation of F-16 block 60 and AMRAAM AIM 120D/C-7 should have provided adequate information regarding the capabilities of this mix. In fact there is little doubt that key individuals knew about it. There should be volumes on this. The question is why was it not taken into consideration? Was the information classified? Was this information not included in upskilling Su Drivers?

Excellent insights by @DivineHeretic as usual.

Just to meddle around a bit.

Speculative points:

1. The GoI, in it's assessment, expected the GoP and Pakistani Military to deny a strike. Hence, there was no revision of ROEs which prohibited any of own Military Fixed Wing aircraft from moving into LC buffer zone as also prohibited engaging targets across the LC. But given the magnitude of success perhaps, it became difficult for both GoP and Pakistan Military to deny the strike, as those affected were not going to allow a non-response to go unchallenged. Faced with a difficult choice, Pakistan did what it does best - spin a yarn.

2. I have my doubts about anyone in IAF being under the impression that the PAF will not try and down the IAF aircrafts by firing across LC. However, this view is quite pervasive in the general public and I am quite amused to note this. Had that been the case, jammers would not have been deployed on own side extensively as has been the case. The inherent antithesis in the assertion of 'unexpected BVRAAM' and jammer usage by own aircraft should have been a clear pointer.

3. The only thing that went wrong that day was the Wg Cdr Abhinandan, VrC episode. He got away because of shooting down a F-16 (confirmed from AWACS and IADS 'captures') and also because of being in public eye.

4. The shoot down of own Mi-17 indicated what is actually an issue that affects all armed forces the world over - mediocrity and non-adherence to SOPs. The COO was made aware of the possibility of the Radar signature being of own Helicopter which had taken off, he ignored it, pulling rank on the junior to give an order to shoot. The ATC officer who ordered recall, failed to inform the AD assets of the same. The Pilot flying the aircraft, apparently (as per media reports) failed to switch on IFF. I think the latter should also be court martialled posthumously, at least in the procedures. Can the COO be blamed? I do not think so. Can the ATC? Again, not entirely. The Pilot? Same status. There were faults of all involved. And a clear lack of experience (the battle experience). Such incidents are common in Army too, which is more battle hardened and experienced. There remains an officer who is on a growth trajectory to achieve at least two stars if not three, who is responsible for giving a mortar firing solution while drunk, which resulted in deaths of more than 10 of our own troops once, along LC. Such is the life. Mediocrity (at times criminal) does get rewarded in the forces. For a mediocre person hesitates to take risks, maintains status quo (and hence does not cause turbulence in system) and is never a threat for others. A bright guy usually is finished by the time the person achieves the rank of Maj/Lt Col and equivalents in forces.
 
Excellent insights by @DivineHeretic as usual.

Just to meddle around a bit.

Speculative points:

1. The GoI, in it's assessment, expected the GoP and Pakistani Military to deny a strike. Hence, there was no revision of ROEs which prohibited any of own Military Fixed Wing aircraft from moving into LC buffer zone as also prohibited engaging targets across the LC. But given the magnitude of success perhaps, it became difficult for both GoP and Pakistan Military to deny the strike, as those affected were not going to allow a non-response to go unchallenged. Faced with a difficult choice, Pakistan did what it does best - spin a yarn.

2. I have my doubts about anyone in IAF being under the impression that the PAF will not try and down the IAF aircrafts by firing across LC. However, this view is quite pervasive in the general public and I am quite amused to note this. Had that been the case, jammers would not have been deployed on own side extensively as has been the case. The inherent antithesis in the assertion of 'unexpected BVRAAM' and jammer usage by own aircraft should have been a clear pointer.

3. The only thing that went wrong that day was the Wg Cdr Abhinandan, VrC episode. He got away because of shooting down a F-16 (confirmed from AWACS and IADS 'captures') and also because of being in public eye.

4. The shoot down of own Mi-17 indicated what is actually an issue that affects all armed forces the world over - mediocrity and non-adherence to SOPs. The COO was made aware of the possibility of the Radar signature being of own Helicopter which had taken off, he ignored it, pulling rank on the junior to give an order to shoot. The ATC officer who ordered recall, failed to inform the AD assets of the same. The Pilot flying the aircraft, apparently (as per media reports) failed to switch on IFF. I think the latter should also be court martialled posthumously, at least in the procedures. Can the COO be blamed? I do not think so. Can the ATC? Again, not entirely. The Pilot? Same status. There were faults of all involved. And a clear lack of experience (the battle experience). Such incidents are common in Army too, which is more battle hardened and experienced. There remains an officer who is on a growth trajectory to achieve at least two stars if not three, who is responsible for giving a mortar firing solution while drunk, which resulted in deaths of more than 10 of our own troops once, along LC. Such is the life. Mediocrity (at times criminal) does get rewarded in the forces. For a mediocre person hesitates to take risks, maintains status quo (and hence does not cause turbulence in system) and is never a threat for others. A bright guy usually is finished by the time the person achieves the rank of Maj/Lt Col and equivalents in forces.
IN also uses this combo of AAMs and we knew from very fisrt day what this combo can do and you will be shocked to know that IN did not follow IAF in acqusition of missiles for its fighters.
Slowly but surely we will teach IAF their place in air warfare.
 
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Once the Radar controllers and Su drivers began to confirm that BVRAAMS were indeed launched across the LOC, the command went into a shell, not providing new ROEs to fighter crews who were by now caught up in engagement. Void of new ROEs and PAF ACs staying well within POK, GCI was constrained into asking IAF ACs into defensive positions
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LC. But given the magnitude of success perhaps, it became difficult for both GoP and Pakistan Military to deny the strike, as those affected were not going to allow a non-response to go unchallenged.
Success sir?
 
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IN also uses this combo of AAMs and we knew from very fisrt day what this combo can do and you will be shocked to know that IN did nit follow IAF in acqusition of missiles for its fighters.
Slowly but surely we will teach IAF their place in air warfare.
IAF should be reduced to some aviation club for air shows entertainment only. Their assets be given to much more competent IN and IA.
 
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Success sir?
Yes success.

That is the only explanation for ISPR to come forward and admitting the strike. They evaluated that covering up is not an option. Fear of GoI making it public like the 'surgical strike' (For political milage or what not) and possible exposure by satellite or on PGM camera. Frankly, we were not prepared for the second act.
 
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IAF should be reduced to some aviation club for air shows entertainment only. Their assets be given to much more competent IN and IA.
Yes. Just for doing a vertical charlie every year on 26th Jan, they walk off with largest amount of funds and also murder of sister services. Let them do only vertical charlie and leave combat to those who really know the stuff and the game.
 
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The pount brought out by @DivineHeretic is what I also stated just after 27th Feb. please read my posts of that time. IAF just went clueless with options and they did not know what to do? They not only failed misrably to analyse the build up of fighters in Pak airspace but when the battle started, they even failed to respond in a way whichwas supposed to be their copy book response. IAF was stunned by what PAF did, but I know from my days as a fighter pilot that counter strikes are done without waste of time and when such fprmations are returning for landing, they are to be targeted and destroyed. IAF did not launch any such counter strike and called their failure a success. What stopped IAF from such counter strikes and who could have stopped them. It was ther sheer incompetence and nothing else.
 
1. The GoI, in it's assessment, expected the GoP and Pakistani Military to deny a strike. Hence, there was no revision of ROEs which prohibited any of own Military Fixed Wing aircraft from moving into LC buffer zone as also prohibited engaging targets across the LC. But given the magnitude of success perhaps, it became difficult for both GoP and Pakistan Military to deny the strike, as those affected were not going to allow a non-response to go unchallenged. Faced with a difficult choice, Pakistan did what it does best - spin a yarn.

Who are these people paid handsomely to make such assumptions? How were they so sure that PAF would definitely fail to intercept Balakote strike formation and if they succeed even partially, it would not be a start of see and shoot from that very moment?

In our village, if a guy comes home after slapping the other, he sleeps with desi katta (local made gun) overnight expecting the other guy to strike back. And these guys were resting after violating sovereignty of an enemy and then mocking them in broad day light next day on TV?

Where is my pessimist guy in all these planners?

3. The only thing that went wrong that day was the Wg Cdr Abhinandan, VrC episode. He got away because of shooting down a F-16 (confirmed from AWACS and IADS 'captures') and also because of being in public eye.

For me it was the only thing went well, if it does actually. By grace of him, we can say we retaliated to fighters which came to strike our military installations, otherwise where is the response?

Our military installation must hold more sanctity than balakote. If the later can draw a response, why should not former?

4. The shoot down of own Mi-17 indicated what is actually an issue that affects all armed forces the world over - mediocrity and non-adherence to SOPs. The COO was made aware of the possibility of the Radar signature being of own Helicopter which had taken off, he ignored it, pulling rank on the junior to give an order to shoot. The ATC officer who ordered recall, failed to inform the AD assets of the same. The Pilot flying the aircraft, apparently (as per media reports) failed to switch on IFF. I think the latter should also be court martialled posthumously, at least in the procedures. Can the COO be blamed? I do not think so. Can the ATC? Again, not entirely. The Pilot? Same status. There were faults of all involved. And a clear lack of experience (the battle experience). Such incidents are common in Army too, which is more battle hardened and experienced. There remains an officer who is on a growth trajectory to achieve at least two stars if not three, who is responsible for giving a mortar firing solution while drunk, which resulted in deaths of more than 10 of our own troops once, along LC. Such is the life. Mediocrity (at times criminal) does get rewarded in the forces. For a mediocre person hesitates to take risks, maintains status quo (and hence does not cause turbulence in system) and is never a threat for others. A bright guy usually is finished by the time the person achieves the rank of Maj/Lt Col and equivalents in forces.

It can happen to our own, but the problem is how many SAMs were fired on the real enemy? Do we have the counts?

Sad state. For me it was a military let down, our economic and diplomatic clout is compensating for it.

@BlackOpsIndia
 
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The GoI, in it's assessment, expected the GoP and Pakistani Military to deny a
Why should GOI take all the blame. As a military response was involved, IAF top brass was involved in the planning, and gauging the Pakistani response to the balakot strikes..
 
The Pilot flying the aircraft, apparently (as per media reports) failed to switch on IFF. I think the latter should also be court martialled posthumously, at least in the procedures.

Doesn't the story say they didn't fly with IFF on because it was interfering with civilian radars and communications?
 
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