Ah, Ignorants being his usual self, misunderstanding MoD/IAF's intentions, their plans and being unable to relate to all that's happening.
The IAF had always planned to manufacture both M2000 and Mig-29 in large numbers, it wasn't one or the other. The Mig-29 simply changed into MKI 'cause the SU had no intention of offering the Flanker for export. It was just our bad luck that we were far too broke to choose the M2000 as well.
And when the opportunity came in 2001, it was just happenstance that M2000's development ceased and it lost its potential value in the eyes of the IAF thereby leading them to switch their sights to MMRCA.
Our TE requirement changed only in the 90s, meaning it's not just MKI, but we also wanted MMRCA and MCA. 150-200 each, that's 500-600 jets. Apart from 300+ SE jets. And the only reason we split the requirement was, as per the architect of MMRCA, we could not fully trust the Russians with an order for 400+ MKIs and become entirely dependent on them.
I have posted this a thousand times, I don't know why it doesn't stick.
In the second session, moderator Inderjit Badhwar initiated the discussion deconstructing the evolution and process of the Indian Air Force (IAF) competition for 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA).
stratpost.com
“What surprises me – since you’re the author of that RFP (MMRCA) – is that what is the significance of the term medium? Is it weight, is it performance, is it range, is it endurance? A. And B – how did you end up with a bunch of aircraft from single-engined to twin-engined, from 17 tons to 30 tons – I mean why did you stand for it? Make up your mind what you want. Whether it is performance, whether it is weight. So I think this mess, in which we are today has been self-inflicted.” – Admiral (retd.) Arun Prakash
“It’s about operational requirements – you know, meeting a certain spectrum of operational utility. You had to have a mix of both – I’m defending that. And I’m defending it very strongly. We had to actually bring in this Medium Multi Role Combat – because it was originally MRCA – primarily because you had to – although I’d said that weight consideration is no more a relevant issue – to categorize aircraft by weight limitations – we had to keep the Su-30 out because otherwise the Su-30 would have come into the competition, as well. And the question would have been raised, ‘Why can’t you buy more of the Su-30s’. Now you can’t put all your eggs in one basket – strategically, it’s unwise. That’s one of the primary reasons. And therefore you created this Medium Multi role Combat Aircraft (competition) which is 30 tons and below. Okay, so the Su-30 is 34 tons and above – 34 tons category. So the heaviest aircraft in this entire category was the F/A-18, which is 29 tons. The costliest aircraft was the Eurofighter, as per our estimation at that point of time. The cheapest aircraft was – and the lightest aircraft was the Gripen. The F-16 would have been the cheapest. But the point is, you had the original contenders who were there in the fray – you couldn’t have removed them because that process had started off. But you had the new technologies – 4 and half generation aircraft and you also had a spectrum of cost differentials from one end -I would say, averaging about 40 million dollars to almost 100 million dollars – or 85 million dollars.” – Air Marshal (retd) M Matheswaran
First bold sentence: We can't completely rely on the Russians.
Second bold sentence: "Atithi devo bhava." F-16 and Gripen had no chance of winning, participating Olympians, but it was rude to kick them out.
Simply put, if the Russians were 100% trustworthy, we could have skipped out on MMRCA entirely and simply bought more MKIs. Like the SMs, or the Su-35S, or a combination of the two combined with some European/Israeli tech, like and AESA radar. Another reason was technological, MKI was simply old tech by then 'cause the Eurocanards were truly next gen. When it came to both MKI and T-90, we asked for the best they had. It in fact took the Russians quite a bit of convincing to prove to the Indian team that they did not have a better tank than the T-90 at the time. So, if instead of MKI, the Berkut was operational, we would have very likely gone for that instead and built 400 of them, notwithstanding the affordability aspect.
Funny how people forget we were seriously going after FGFA too, not just MRFA and AMCA. MMRCA may have taught the IAF some important lessons, which they hope will be repeated with MRFA because the definition of generation is changing again.
As for why we are "wasting time with MRFA," we are not. As explained already, indigenous tech doesn't exist. If I place a Rafale order today, I'm guaranteed delivery in 2027. But if I place an AMCA order today, even 10 years is questionable. Hell, even 15 years is wild. This is the reason MRFA exists. The IAF is chasing after guaranteed capability, not vaporware. Rafale will be available in 2035 with a large complement of crew and infrastructure already developed, courtesy of the F3R and IN's F4. AMCA needs all the way until 2045 to get to that point. Although the MKI was introduced in 2002, the IAF declared it was operational only after 2007. Rafale went through the same process, it was IOC-ready in 2001, but the F3 became available only in 2006. And F3+ took all the way until 2012 before it became a serious contender for export.
Fighter jets have a long gestation period. First flight, IOC, FOC and then achieving an operationally viable standard. For example, the F-35 flew in 2006, achieved IOC standards presumably in 2019, but even in 2024 it's not operationally viable, it will achieve that sometime after 2026, more likely closer to 2030. PAF's JF-17 too was "introduced" in 2007, but it became operationally viable only after 2017 or so, when the SD-10 was fully cleared for use. Until then it was no better than the Jaguar, never mind the fact that only B3 is somewhat viable against the IAF. AMCA will have to go through the same process, so IOC by 2035, FOC by 2040, operationally viable by 2045, by which time the IAF will have sufficiently trained crew and infrastructure, with the jet having achieved a lot of its original technological objectives.
Only when your jet becomes operationally viable can you reliably take it into combat. For example, the MKI was not survivable until 2007. Then we saw how quickly the jet's numbers climbed between 2009 and 2015.
As for the manned-unmanned debate, as tech catches up, manned jets will become unmanned. They call that optionally manned. The goal behind it is to be risk-averse. If something goes wrong, there needs to be a cockpit for a human pilot to take over. But if things go well, most of the important missions will be conducted by unmanned fighters, ie, the cockpit will be empty, or will perhaps carry some other equipment. They can even remove the canopy and seal the cockpit while retaining aerodynamics.
So now the Americans are debating whether NGAD should be a more expensive optionally manned jet or a cheaper fully unmanned jet. Our industry is obviously not at the same level, so we cannot make AMCA unmanned right off the bat, but it will come with optionally manned features in the post-FOC standard; ie, the last 5 squadrons, 2040+. Naturally, the Rafale F5 could also come with such a feature.
It's possible that around the 2050s almost all of IAF's manned jets could become unmanned, or at least 70-80% or so.
www.airandspaceforces.com
