MMRCA 2.0 - Updates and Discussions

[Picdelamirand-oil]

Why Rafale could be IAF’s default MRFA option​

Acquiring tried-and-tested Rafales would speedily boost the strength of IAF’s fighter squadrons.​

A HOST of recent developments have placed Dassault Aviation, France’s principal combat aircraft manufacturer, in pole position to potentially secure the IAF’s long-pending requirement for 114 multi-role fighter aircraft (MRFA) with its twin-engine Rafales.

Joining the dots, a cross-section of military veterans, defence analysts and industry officials have posited that backed by growing Rafale sales to India and Dassault’s inclination to transfer fighter and related technology to it, the IAF could well end up with Rafale as its default MRFA option.

If so, it would be an ironical redux of the Ministry of Defence’s stillborn 2007-08 tender for 126 Rafales — of which 108 were to be licence-built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited — that was scrapped in 2015 due to contractual, political and bureaucratic snafus.

A review of these emerging dealings with regard to the possible induction of additional Rafales into the IAF is instructive on multiple counts. At the outset, Dassault will supply 26 Rafale-M (Marine) fighters to the Indian Navy (IN) for deployment aboard INS Vikrant, its newly commissioned aircraft carrier. The multi-role carrier-borne fighter’s (MRCBF) ‘commonality’ with the 36 Rafales, which the IAF had imported in 2016 for $9 billion, had influenced the IN’s choice following user trials in 2022, which featured the rival Boeing F/A-18 Block III ‘Super Hornet’ fighter.

The delivery of these 26 fighters over the next two-three years would total an inventory of 62 Rafale variants in India’s arsenal, not an insignificant number. Hence, increasing this quantity further, according to some retired senior fighter pilots, to meet the IAF’s requirement for 114 MRFA makes ‘immense operational, commercial and logistical sense.’

Dassault, they said, had already established a Rafale flight training and Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) facility at Ambala Air Force Station, which would go a long way towards reducing the overall costs for any additional buys. Importantly, acquiring tried-and-tested Rafales would hasten fighter inductions by dispensing with trials and boost the IAF’s declining fighter squadrons, whose number has depreciated to around 29 from a sanctioned strength of 42.

They added that acquiring extra Rafales would also streamline the IAF’s diverse fighter catalogue, which currently features seven aircraft types, sustaining all of which is an enduring logistical nightmare and a costly affair for the force.

In a related development that could enhance Dassault’s MRFA bid, the French manufacturer is believed to be in advanced negotiations to acquire 51 per cent stake of its partner Anil Ambani in Dassault Reliance Aerospace Limited (DRAL) joint venture in Nagpur. India permits 100 per cent foreign direct investment in individual cases and Dassault is reportedly keen on acquiring DRAL, which, if effected, would augment its chances of bagging the MRFA deal.

At present, Dassault owns 49% of DRAL, formed within days of India confirming the IAF’s 36 Rafale purchase, to discharge the 50% offset obligation of the inclusive contractual price in accordance with MoD’s procurement procedures.

Initially, DRAL was tasked with producing components for Dassault’s Falcon business jets and only recently, it had begun producing sub-assemblies like engine doors and canopies for Rafales. But as per media reports, a domestic financial resource crunch had curtailed DRAL’s manufacturing capabilities, rendering it vulnerable to a buyout.

Meanwhile, the MRFA procurement envisages the importing of a squadron of 18 shortlisted fighters in flyaway condition from amongst seven models proposed by overseas original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in response to the IAF’s April 2018 Request for Information (RFI). The remaining 96 platforms would be built indigenously by a collaborative venture between the qualified OEM and a domestic strategic partner (SP) from either the private or public sector, with progressively enhanced levels of indigenisation in the all-encompassing deal valued around $25 billion.

The MRFA tender is expected imminently, industry sources said, with the selected platform required to complete 30-35 years of squadron service or flying time of 6,000 hours, with at least one midlife upgrade. Senior IAF officers estimated that MRFA numbers could increase to around 200 units for the IAF alone, in addition to possible export options, resulting in the platforms’ cost amortisation.

The six other OEMs which had responded to the IAF’s MRFA RFI are Eurofighter Typhoon, Sweden’s Saab (Gripen-E), Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation and Sukhoi Corporation (MiG-35 ‘Fulcrum-F’ and Su-35 ‘Flanker-E’) and the US’ Boeing and Lockheed Martin (F/A-18 and upgraded F-21).

However, in the light of the ongoing war in Ukraine, evaluating the two Russian fighter types for eventual IAF acquisition was, justifiably, irrational, considering the grave spares and components crisis the force is facing with regard to its fleet of 260 multi-role Sukhoi-30 MKIs and 50-odd upgraded MiG-29M fighter-bombers.

Alternatively, shortlisting the Typhoon would only mean adding to the IAF’s continuing logistic challenges, whilst the US’ F-18 and F-21 — a retrofitted F-16 — had been rejected by it on multiple capability counts during trials conducted 2010 onwards for the binned MMRCA contract. Saab’s Gripen-E, on the other hand, was a single-engine platform, and though the MRFA RFI had not specified any preference for single or dual power packs, the IAF’s intrinsic preference for the latter remains unstated.

Hence, by the process of elimination, Rafale was more than favourably placed in the MRFA sweepstakes, due not only to its operational superiority over its competitors, as acknowledged by the IAF — and now by the IN — but also the host of multiple ancillary factors.

There was also the abandoned contractual template for the MMRCA contract, which, industry officials said, could easily be ‘tweaked’ to suit an analogous MRFA purchase by resolving earlier glitches and shortening negotiations. These anomalies had centred on insistence by the MoD that Dassault shoulder eventual quality control responsibility for the 108 Rafales licence-built by HAL. This unwarranted conditionality had emerged as the deal-breaker for the MMRCA deal and led to the IAF procuring just 36 Rafales in flyaway condition, all of which were delivered by late 2022.

Even geopolitically, Indian diplomats and security officials conceded that it was less ‘arduous’ conducting materiel commerce with Paris than with Washington as the former was more flexible and pragmatic than the latter, especially with regard to transferring hi-tech military knowhow.

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

Allemagne vs Inde : La France doit-elle réviser sa doctrine de coopération industrielle de Défense ?

Germany vs India: Should France revise its defence industrial cooperation doctrine?

Shortly after his accession to the Élysée Palace in 2017, President Emmanuel Macron undertook to give substance to one of the key objectives of his international and European action, agreeing with German Chancellor Angela Merkel to make the Franco-German couple the pivot of the emergence of a Defence Europe.

To achieve this, the two Heads of State announced ambitious industrial cooperation through the launch of 5 major Franco-German defence industrial programmes: the new-generation SCAF fighter aircraft to replace the French Rafale and German Typhoon by 2040, and the new-generation MGCS battle tank to replace the Leclerc and Leopard 2 by 2035; the CIFS long-range artillery programme to replace the Caesars and Pzh2000s as well as the LRUs of the French Army and Bundeswehr; the MAWS patrol aircraft to replace the Atlantique 2s and Orion P-3Cs; and the Tiger III programme and its long-range anti-tank missile to modernise the Tiger fleet of combat helicopters and replace the Hellfire and Spike missiles currently in use.

Launched at a time when tensions between Angela Merkel and Donald Trump were at their height, these programmes quickly faded when Berlin and Washington softened their positions, and even more so after the arrival of Joe Biden in the White House.

Thus the Tiger III helicopter and its missile, the CIFS artillery system and the MAWS maritime patrol aircraft were successively, if not strictly abandoned, Berlin having never openly arbitrated on their subject, then at any rate shelved until Paris undertook to develop these capabilities in another way, in the face of operational pressure and looming deadlines.

After almost exploding in mid-air over the tensions between Dassault and Airbus DS over the management of the first pillar of the SCAF programme, the design of the NGF fighter itself, the programme was recently brought out of the rut to launch the prototype design phase, However, this was not without a significant delay, which led France to launch a much more ambitious Rafale F5 programme, capable of filling the gap in both operational and commercial terms.

As for the MGCS programme, it is now at a standstill, notably after Berlin imposed the integration of Rheinmetall into the programme in 2019, thereby destabilising the initial balanced industrial sharing between France's Nexter and Germany's KMW, which have now been brought together in the KNDS joint venture.

In addition, the latter is now faced with a resumption of world demand for heavy tanks following the war in Ukraine, leading to a profound reconfiguration of the market and therefore to major shifts in timetables, potentially very beneficial for the German industry, but catastrophic for the French industry and armies.

At the end of August 2022, the new Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, announced the launch of the European Sky Shield initiative, aimed at pooling and organising the detection and engagement resources of European countries in the field of anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence.

Although 14 European countries joined the initiative when it was launched, France is not taking part, although it is not clear whether this is due to a refusal by Paris or a German initiative that deliberately excluded France and, above all, its industrial solutions in this area.

In fact, it has to be said that the objectives set for 2017 are no longer relevant, while no one is in a position to predict whether MGCS or even SCAF will come to fruition. But the difficulties encountered by Paris in recent years with Germany are not specific to that country, far from it.

Indeed, France has traditionally regarded its direct neighbours (Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK and Belgium) as potential partners in this field, and has multiplied initiatives in this area over the last few decades, with no better outcome than the Franco-German programmes.

For example, London unilaterally withdrew from the PA2 programme to design a common aircraft carrier, followed by the FCAS programme to design a combat drone, and the joint anti-missile destroyers between France, Italy and the UK.

Furthermore, of the initiatives launched at the time of the Lancaster House agreements, only the naval mine warfare programme and the ANL/Sea Viper light anti-ship missile remain close to entry into service, while the FMC/FMAN cruise missile programme, after numerous stops&goes, now seems to be on a solid trajectory for entry into service in 2028.

The situation is not much better as regards cooperation with Italy, with which France has effectively designed the SAMP/T Mamba anti-aircraft system and the Aster missile, as well as the Horizon anti-aircraft destroyer after the withdrawal of the British, But it has run up against profound differences over the FREMM frigate programme, where the French and Italian models share only 15% of the components, and even more so over the initiative to bring Fincantieri and Naval Group together, which ultimately gave rise only to Naviris, a far cry from the 'Airbus Naval' initially envisaged.

Cooperative ventures with Spain have been fewer and less ambitious, which explains why they have often gone better, apart from the one involving a merger between DCNS (now Naval Group) and Navantia in the submarine sector to design the Scorpene, which ended up in court on accusations of industrial plundering by DCNS against its Spanish partner, and Madrid's withdrawal from the Scorpene programme to develop its own model, the S-80.

In fact, only Belgium, which has been roundly criticised, particularly by France, for its choice of the F-35 rather than a European aircraft, has shown itself to be a solid partner in the defence field in recent years, with the CaMo programme to equip the two countries' land armies with the same equipment and doctrines for greater interoperability, and the McM mine warfare programme entrusted to Naval Group and the Belgian ECA, as a result of pressure from the Belgian side on the Dutch side of the programme.

As we can see, there is every indication that the doctrine of considering our direct neighbours as France's preferred partners for the development of defence industrial programmes is far from effective - quite the contrary.

Not only does it have a particularly low success rate, whatever the country, but more often than not it results in delays and additional costs that handicap the French defence effort, and sometimes the industrial effort itself.

At the opposite end of the spectrum are the customers of the French defence industry, the very people who enable France to maintain a global and efficient defence industry, and who make a very significant contribution to the financing of the national defence effort.

These include countries such as Greece and Belgium in Europe, Egypt, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the Middle East, India and probably Indonesia in Asia, as well as Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina in South America.

As far as Paris is concerned, even though these countries make a considerable contribution to France's national defence effort, and even though their decisions in favour of French equipment are helping to forge geopolitical links with them, they are more often than not regarded only as customers, albeit strategic ones, but with whom there is no question, for the time being, of undertaking joint programmes potentially intended to equip the French armed forces, as is the case with Germany, the United Kingdom or Italy.

Yet all these countries now want to develop their defence industries and technological capabilities, and are prepared to make major efforts to do so.

What's more, as they are more in demand in this area than European countries, and therefore less competitive with the French defence industry, bilateral or multilateral cooperation would be simplified, enabling efficient industrial set-ups both for them and for preserving and increasing French industrial and technological skills.

Finally, many of these countries have substantial investment capacities, potentially greater than those of many European countries, and a governmental organisation that is both more permanent and more centralised than European democracies, which are particularly volatile and therefore subject to certain reversals depending on the results of electoral events.

On several occasions in the analyses published on this site, we have mentioned such potential cooperative ventures, whether it be the design of an intermediate-generation battle tank with India, an electronic warfare Rafale with the United Arab Emirates, or a successor to the Mirage 2000 with Greece and Egypt.

What's more, the requirements profile of these countries is much more likely to match that of many other countries in the world, rather than Germany or the UK, which would give this equipment a definite competitive edge on the international stage.

It should also be noted that countries such as India, Greece, Egypt and Indonesia have perfectly qualified personnel who can be easily integrated into French industrial processes, as demonstrated by the construction of the Kalvari class submarines in India.

Their production costs are also significantly lower than those of their European counterparts, giving them a potential competitive advantage on the export market that is far from negligible.

Finally, while the cooperation initiated with Germany as part of the SCAF or MGCS programme will result in a certain loss of skills in the industrial and technological field for the major French defence groups, such cooperation would, on the contrary, enable these skills to be extended, thereby strengthening the long-term viability of French industries belonging to the DTIB.

As we can see, beyond a European fantasy that exists only in the vision of the French President, and which is most often far from being shared by our European partners, the French defence industrial cooperation doctrine, which focuses on direct neighbours, is clearly not the most effective way of leading France and its defence industry towards a dominant position at a time when the market has been rapidly reorganising itself in this area over the last few years, under the effect of global tensions.

On the other hand, turning to the traditional customers of the French defence industry, those who for decades have been the very lifeblood of this industry, and who today are clearly in demand of this type of cooperation, would bring numerous opportunities both in the operational field, by making it possible to equip the armed forces without having to assume the full development costs, and in the industrial and technological field, by preserving and extending the skills of the industrialists, and from the political point of view, by positioning France as a key partner for all these countries called upon to play a growing role on the international scene.

With Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's forthcoming visit to France for the 14 July parade raising many expectations in the aeronautical sector, with the probable order for 26 Rafale M aircraft, and in the naval sector, with the possible order for three additional Scorpene submarines and Franco-Indian cooperation on the Indian nuclear attack submarine programme, it is certainly time for France to step up its efforts in this area, It is certainly time for France to revise its doctrine on partnerships and defence industrial cooperation, and turn to these countries, which are currently the most promising and probably the least restrictive.

 

[Bon Plan]

Not doubting the capabilities of Rafale but Egypt refused Su-35S because of US pressure, IMO(same as Indonesia).

At least it is a (small) part of the truth, but in case of real US pressure, They would have been no other choice than to take US birds....
But they choose Rafale.

 

[Bon Plan]

It will be interesting to see what Indonesia thinks about both Rafale and IFX.

How to compare a paper plane and a mature one?
The Netherlands did, with F35 and Rafale F3. The then powerpoint F35 won by a 0,02 margin on 10... This paper F35 was promised to be affordable, mature before 2020 and supercruising. Broken promises.

 

[randomradio]

How to compare a paper plane and a mature one?
The Netherlands did, with F35 and Rafale F3. The then powerpoint F35 won by a 0,02 margin on 10... This paper F35 was promised to be affordable, mature before 2020 and supercruising. Broken promises.

From Indonesia's perspective, both aircraft will become operational at roughly the same time, just a few years gap.

A comparison between IFX and Rafale will also reveal its relation to the F-35 via KFX. So it's a pretty decent way to figure out where the Rafale stands versus the F-35.

 

[Herciv]

From Indonesia's perspective, both aircraft will become operational at roughly the same time, just a few years gap.

A comparison between IFX and Rafale will also reveal its relation to the F-35 via KFX. So it's a pretty decent way to figure out where the Rafale stands versus the F-35.

I would be a technical/operational only comparison since the KFX does have several ITAR relevant components.
This point by itself is sufficient to explain several rafale wins since it is more or less in the same category than F-35. Better on some points, less on others.

 

[Bon Plan]

From Indonesia's perspective, both aircraft will become operational at roughly the same time, just a few years gap.

A comparison between IFX and Rafale will also reveal its relation to the F-35 via KFX. So it's a pretty decent way to figure out where the Rafale stands versus the F-35.

Rafale is already fully mature. KFX, even in few years, will only have limited capacity : probably average or good in Air to Air, probably far less in air to ground, as usual.

 

[randomradio]

I would be a technical/operational only comparison since the KFX does have several ITAR relevant components.
This point by itself is sufficient to explain several rafale wins since it is more or less in the same category than F-35. Better on some points, less on others.

We will most definitely see some sort of technical comparison by the Koreans.

 

[randomradio]

Rafale is already fully mature. KFX, even in few years, will only have limited capacity : probably average or good in Air to Air, probably far less in air to ground, as usual.

The Koreans have significant details about the Rafale already. They would naturally have made a jet that's superior to both the Rafale and the Typhoon in many areas. Maturity is a different topic.

Yes, it has been designed for A2A, to complement the F-35.

 

[Bon Plan]

The Koreans have significant details about the Rafale already. They would naturally have made a jet that's superior to both the Rafale and the Typhoon in many areas. Maturity is a different topic.

Yes, it has been designed for A2A, to complement the F-35.

I mean that KFX at the earlier years of its life will only have limited capacity, because you need time to developp all the AtoA and AtoG capacities.
This is where Rafale has the edge. I have no doubt that after 10 years KFX will have all the capacities of a multirole fighter.

 

[randomradio]

I mean that KFX at the earlier years of its life will only have limited capacity, because you need time to developp all the AtoA and AtoG capacities.
This is where Rafale has the edge. I have no doubt that after 10 years KFX will have all the capacities of a multirole fighter.

If we are comparing the KFX with Rafale F5, then the timelines will be similar.

 

[Bon Plan]

If we are comparing the KFX with Rafale F5, then the timelines will be similar.

OK. And KFX at those time will be a noob fighter with only limited capacities.
But I think we are globally saying the same.

 

[randomradio]

OK. And KFX at those time will be a noob fighter with only limited capacities.
But I think we are globally saying the same.

KF-21's FOC is expected in 2028. It will enter limited series production next year.

 

[Hydra]

Is MMRCA 2 still alive?

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

Is MMRCA 2 still alive?

It still moves

 

[Hydra]

It still moves

Earth also moving, doesn't means that earth is alive.

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

Second tranche of 18 Rafale for Indonesia enters into the order backlog​

(Saint-Cloud, France, August 10, 2023) – As part of the contract signed by Indonesia on February 2022 for the acquisition of 42 Rafale, the second tranche of 18 Rafale came into force today.

(Saint-Cloud, France, August 10, 2023) – As part of the contract signed by Indonesia on February 2022 for the acquisition of 42 Rafale, the second tranche of 18 Rafale came into force today. This follows the entry into force in September 2022 of the first tranche of 6 Rafale, bringing the total number of aircraft on order to 24.

The acquisition of the latest-generation Rafale for the Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Udara (Indonesian National Army Air Force) includes a complete “turnkey” solution as well as a substantial industrial return for the Indonesian aeronautical sector. Educational projects will also be launched as part of the technical training of aeronautical know-how.

The “omnirole” Rafale is a unique asset that will ensure Indonesia’s sovereignty and operational independence and reinforce its role as a major regional power.

“This new step consolidates the beginning of a long-term partnership with the Indonesian authorities, whom I would like to thank once again for their confidence. It testifies to the strategic link that unites Indonesia and France, and will be reflected in the growing presence of Dassault Aviation in the country”, said Eric Trappier, Chairman and CEO of Dassault Aviation.

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

To date, Dassault Aviation has 267 Rafales in its order book (55 for Egypt, 36 for Qatar, 36 for India, 24 for Greece, 12 for Croatia, 80 for the United Arab Emirates and 24 for Indonesia). The aircraft manufacturer is also due to finalise the contract for 26 Rafale Marine aircraft, an order announced by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the third and final tranche in Indonesia (18 aircraft). This brings the total number of Rafales sold for export to 311. Far more than the Swedish Gripen (102) and the Eurofighter consortium's Typhoon (151), or even Boeing's Super Hornet (48).

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

Err: Super Hornet (76).

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

New capabilities and new munitions for the Rafale F5

In addition to the UAVs themselves, the Rafale F5 will be equipped with new munitions and new capabilities, enabling it to overcome certain relative weaknesses vis-à-vis the F-35. This is particularly the case in the area of suppression of adversary anti-aircraft defences, commonly referred to by the acronym SEAD which, as we have reported several times since 2018, represented a major gap in the Rafale's operational panoply until now.

Although the composition of this capability, which will be fitted to the Rafale F5, has not yet been officially presented, we can assume that it will be based on the joint use of radar jammers in addition to the aircraft's self-defence systems, to give it the possibility of encompassing other aircraft in its protective bubble, as well as one or more anti-radiation munitions, designed to move up the adversary's radar beam in order to destroy it.

New ammunition for the Rafale F5

The FMC is intended to replace the SCALP cruise missile currently fitted to the Rafales of the French Air Force and Naval Aviation.

The Rafale F5 will also be designed to deploy the new Franco-British FMC (Futur Missile de Croisière) and FMAN (Futur Missile Anti-Navire) missiles, which will replace the SCALP/Storm Shadow cruise missile and the AM39 Exocet missile respectively.

These two long-range precision munitions, currently under development, will have advanced features such as stealth and hypersonic speed to challenge modern air defence systems such as jamming and decoy systems, and will give the aircraft highly advanced long-range strike capabilities in the decades to come.

The aircraft will also be fitted with a pod that merges the capabilities of the Talios target designation pod and the RECO NG reconnaissance pod into a single piece of equipment, giving the fighter highly accurate tactical air-to-ground, air-to-surface and even air-to-air vision, and thus multiple operational options while remaining in non-emitive mode.

Finally, the Rafale F5 will be designed to operate the new ASN4G nuclear-tipped hypersonic cruise missile, which is to replace the ASMPA in the two squadrons of the French Air and Space Force and the flotillas of the French Navy forming the air component of the French deterrent. However, this capability, although critical for French defence, will probably have very little influence on the international market.

Other munitions and capabilities could be integrated into the Rafale F5 by 2030. These include light precision air-to-ground munitions such as the BAT-120 LG from Thales, as well as medium-range prowler munitions, especially as these light weapons would naturally find their place on board the combat UAVs supporting the aircraft, including Remote Carriers.

It will also benefit from the Rafale F4's current arsenal, including the Meteor and MICA NG air-to-air missiles, as well as the highly effective ASSM-propelled glide bombs.

As a result, by 2030, the Rafale F5 will have a comprehensive and highly modern operational toolbox, perfectly in line with and even superior in some respects to that offered by the F-35, depriving the latter of one of the key assets on which it built its commercial success.

The Rafale Club revolution

The Rafale F5 will therefore be a highly modern, high-performance air combat system that is exceptionally well equipped to meet the challenges of the coming decades. However, the Rafale F3 could boast comparable advantages over the F-35A in a number of recent competitions, all of which went in favour of the American aircraft.

Clearly, Dassault Aviation and the French Ministry of Defence have taken full account of the causes of these failures, and intend to rectify them with the Rafale F5, by equipping the aircraft with a discourse and a commercial environment designed to stand up to the American aircraft.

Firstly, it was necessary to come up with a new sales pitch for the F-35. Lockheed-Martin has developed an extremely effective marketing strategy in recent years, presenting not the current performance of the proposed aircraft, but its future performance and capabilities.

And while the timetable and capabilities promised have clearly been far too optimistic to date, this approach has proved highly effective.

Several Rafale operators, such as Greece, have an aeronautical industry that could participate in the development of the aircraft.
For example, during the Dutch competition, the Rafale F3 had to demonstrate its operational capabilities in the face of mere technical and commercial promises from Lockheed-Martin, a good third of which have since been broken. Similarly, Switzerland based its decision on future promises from Lockheed-Martin, both in terms of budget and performance.

Up until now, France had confined itself to protesting against the US strategy in this area, without much success. With the Rafale F5, it is taking the opposite position.

Not only does it promise future performance and capabilities, but it will also be able to demonstrate that the Rafale has followed the same development paths since it entered service, including for its customers. In other words, the Rafale F5 will be fighting with the same weapons, but with sharper arguments against the F-35A in the years to come.

Above all, at the same time as announcing the new timetable for the Rafale F5, aiming for entry into service in 2030, the French Ministry of Defence announced the creation of a "Rafale Club", an initiative designed to bring together users to deal with maintenance and upgradability issues, and to influence and even participate in the development of new capabilities and even new standards for the Rafale. This is not a new strategy, as the success of the Leopard 2 tank was largely based on a similar approach.

But it also represents a profound conceptual revolution in France's approach to the Rafale, making all current and potential users partners and stakeholders in the future of the aircraft and its capabilities.

This new strategy will enable the industrial aeronautical capabilities of Rafale users to be integrated much more effectively into the aircraft's ecosystem, and is a strong argument in favour of the French fighter over the F-35A and its excessively closed environment in the hands of Lockheed-Martin and Washington.

The price argument

Finally, the Rafale F5 will be able to rely on one last strong argument against the F-35A in the years to come: its price. Not that the French aircraft will be cheaper to buy than the Lockheed-Martin fighter.

Since the beginning of this tug-of-war between Lockheed-Martin and Dassault, the two aircraft have systematically been in a similar price range for the acquisition of the aircraft as well as the systems, munitions and all the services required to operate them.

However, for a number of years now, it has been apparent that the cost of owning the F-35A has not only failed to fall to meet the targets initially set by the US Air Force, but has actually continued to rise, well beyond the rate of inflation alone.

Despite Lockheed-Martin's commitments, the cost of owning the F-35 remains very high, and is even tending to rise faster than inflation.

Until now, this drift has been ignored in the equipment competitions in which the fighter has taken part, both because of Lockheed-Martin's perfectly oiled discourse supported by the US State Department, and because of the obvious short-sightedness, whether deliberate or not, of the European, Korean or Australian negotiators on this subject.

However, the subject is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore, including for its main user, the US Air Force, which, without calling into question its attachment to the aircraft, is being forced into major budgetary planning circumnavigations in order to contain the time bomb represented by the aircraft's ownership costs.

And the same will apply on the international stage. Until now, potential customers have been able to feign good faith and ignore the signals in this area, so as to be able to turn to the aircraft offering the most promising technological and operational environment in the making. But this will no longer be the case in the years to come, as the F-35's budgetary shortcomings become increasingly obvious and impossible to ignore, while the promised operational advantages will have been erased, and in some cases far surpassed, by the Rafale F5's new capabilities.

Conclusion

As we have just seen, the arrival of the Rafale F5, and to some extent its mere announcement, will profoundly change the balance of power between the French fighter and its main adversary, the American F-35A. With renewed operational capabilities flirting with the 6ᵉ generation of combat, new-generation appendages and munitions, and a commercial strategy that represents a profound break with French tradition, Dassault Aviation's fighter will, in the years to come, more than match Lockheed-Martin's aircraft in almost every area.

However, the potential results of this strategy are difficult to assess. When the Rafale F5 enters service, the vast majority of European air forces will already be equipped with the F-35A/B, either partially or in full, making the aircraft a standard that will be very difficult to dislodge within NATO, as well as with the main players in the Western sphere of the Pacific theatre.

Similarly, many of the major air forces in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and South America will already have undertaken their modernisation, and the market for the F5, apart from existing customers or those under negotiation in the short term (Iraq, Serbia and perhaps Colombia spring to mind), will be small, unless a new wave of international tensions leads to a new phase of densification of the world's air resources.

However, there are still some potentially important alternatives for the new French fighter. Saudi Arabia, for example, will have to replace its Panavia Tornado and F-15 aircraft over the next few years - a total of some 150 aircraft - as will Morocco, which will have to replace its F-5 and F-1 to keep pace with the modernisation of Algerian aircraft. In addition to Colombia, other South American countries such as Peru and Ecuador will also have to modernise their forces.

Finally, in Europe, Hungary will soon have to replace its Gripens, while some F-35 users, such as Denmark and Belgium, whose fleets are smaller because they are more expensive, could consider the French aircraft to increase their weight.

Be that as it may, it would appear that the Rafale F5 will, in many respects, be much more than just a new version of Dassault Aviation's jewel in the crown, but a genuine new departure for the aircraft, which could see its operational and commercial horizons radically reshaped for decades to come.

It would be hard to wish for more for the only fighter with exclusively European DNA at the moment.

Accueil Meta-defense.fr - Actualités et analyses Défense

Toutes les actualités et les analyses de défense, en Europe et dans le monde, sur Meta-defense.fr

meta-defense.fr