Rafale DH/EH of Indian Air Force : News and Discussions
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Oct 15, 2015,
You don't even try, you foolish boy. We had the Generation III years ago. Tell me more about what has been dropped from the failed F4.2
It seems you don't understand that the F-35's bugs are eternal, they are never corrected, it would cost L.M. too much.
This is the case of Airbus, Boeing.... car manufacturers.... nothing special.
You have a strong source for this first rank news of course ?
I'm waiting to read it.....
and much more !!!
how many stand for F35 so far ? I remember the funny std 3F, with a big "F" for... Final....
You guys are breaking your necks, trying to distract from the failed F4.2. I'm waiting for someone to post a picture of a Rafale to cream over. It's another distraction tactic when the question gets too hard.
What has been dropped from failed F4.2? It also shows that some/most F4.2 can't be updated to F5. Locked in obsolesce.
DGA engineer info in Air Fan interview.
This can be translated as follows: we have pushed back to the F5 standard the elements of the initial F4.2 standard which could have prevented all the current Rafales from being able to climb to the F4.2 standard.
As the commonality of standards is an undeniable advantage, we decided to push this advantage to the maximum.
As a result, the latest F4.2 standard is undoubtedly a little less ambitious than the initial one (but only slightly less, I assure you).
And the things that really require airframe modifications (even if invisible to the naked eye) - like integrating GaN-compliant antennae on the leading edges of the wings, for example - have been pushed back to the F5 standard.
In 10 or 15 years' time, therefore, there will be just 2 standards: F4.2 or F4.3 and F5 (F5 will then evolve into F6 and others, if required, and F4.x will also take on whatever it can from future developments).
The transition from F3R to F4-1 is software only, whereas the F5 standard will require a visit to the manufacturer, to change some modules and modify others. But this modification will only be possible on the latest generation of F3Rs, which means that only export customers will be affected.
For the AAE, this will necessarily be an order for new aircraft, except for the last 28 aircraft to be delivered shortly and the 12 additional aircraft replacing the Greek aircraft, which will be the same as those delivered to our customers, i.e. pre-packaged.
No airframe modifications are planned for the various F5-xxs. Hence the statements about "different standards".
What has been dropped from failed F4.2? It also shows that some/most F4.2 can't be updated to F5. Locked in obsolesce.
DGA engineer info in Air Fan interview.
This can be translated as follows: we have pushed back to the F5 standard the elements of the initial F4.2 standard which could have prevented all the current Rafales from being able to climb to the F4.2 standard.
As the commonality of standards is an undeniable advantage, we decided to push this advantage to the maximum.
As a result, the latest F4.2 standard is undoubtedly a little less ambitious than the initial one (but only slightly less, I assure you).
And the things that really require airframe modifications (even if invisible to the naked eye) - like integrating GaN-compliant antennae on the leading edges of the wings, for example - have been pushed back to the F5 standard.
In 10 or 15 years' time, therefore, there will be just 2 standards: F4.2 or F4.3 and F5 (F5 will then evolve into F6 and others, if required, and F4.x will also take on whatever it can from future developments).
The transition from F3R to F4-1 is software only, whereas the F5 standard will require a visit to the manufacturer, to change some modules and modify others. But this modification will only be possible on the latest generation of F3Rs, which means that only export customers will be affected.
For the AAE, this will necessarily be an order for new aircraft, except for the last 28 aircraft to be delivered shortly and the 12 additional aircraft replacing the Greek aircraft, which will be the same as those delivered to our customers, i.e. pre-packaged.
No airframe modifications are planned for the various F5-xxs. Hence the statements about "different standards".
According to SIPRI, with the 36 Rafales IAF ordered
350 MICA
200 SCALP-EG
300 AASM-Hammer
200 Meteor
350 MICA
200 SCALP-EG
300 AASM-Hammer
200 Meteor
Ask Pic, it was his link. F4.2 gutted and block F4.2/3 obsolescence
"
DGA engineer info in Air Fan interview.
This can be translated as follows: we have pushed back to the F5 standard the elements of the initial F4.2 standard which could have prevented all the current Rafales from being able to climb to the F4.2 standard.
As the commonality of standards is an undeniable advantage, we decided to push this advantage to the maximum.
As a result, the latest F4.2 standard is undoubtedly a little less ambitious than the initial one (but only slightly less, I assure you).
And the things that really require airframe modifications (even if invisible to the naked eye) - like integrating GaN-compliant antennae on the leading edges of the wings, for example - have been pushed back to the F5 standard.
In 10 or 15 years' time, therefore, there will be just 2 standards: F4.2 or F4.3 and F5 (F5 will then evolve into F6 and others, if required, and F4.x will also take on whatever it can from future developments).
The transition from F3R to F4-1 is software only, whereas the F5 standard will require a visit to the manufacturer, to change some modules and modify others. But this modification will only be possible on the latest generation of F3Rs, which means that only export customers will be affected.
For the AAE, this will necessarily be an order for new aircraft, except for the last 28 aircraft to be delivered shortly and the 12 additional aircraft replacing the Greek aircraft, which will be the same as those delivered to our customers, i.e. pre-packaged.
No airframe modifications are planned for the various F5-xxs. Hence the statements about "different standards"."
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As the other members of the 'French Team' have already announced, Air&Cosmos magazine published a special issue in July devoted to the future F5 standard of the Rafale. I'm going to publish the main article here, entitled "A 5++ generation Rafale". It's quite detailed, so it will take several posts (and days).
Here's the outline already, as well as the first part:
Intro
The RBE2-XG radar
————-
*As an introduction to the "Rafale F5" dossier, the magazine has devoted a detailed article to Russian (and Chinese) Integrated Air Defense Systems. Here’s the intro (i could post a full translation if any of you are interested):
A2/AD and IADS: a little-known threat
(intro) Before looking at the many technological breakthroughs offered by the new Rafale, it is worth going back to the reason for the need for it, namely the growing risk associated with IADS. The conflict in Ukraine and the tensions in the China Sea have shown that Western air superiority is being challenged by the return of high-intensity warfare, which is characterised by a massification of equipment, an acceleration of tempo, a narrowing of the technological gap with the adversary and, finally, increasing recourse to connectivity between weapons systems in order to multiply their effects. In this area, Russian and Chinese air defence capabilities have now reached such a level that the A2/AD bubbles that make them up are now structured by a highly complex integrated system (IADS) that coordinates, reinforces and protects them. Only the United States still has the capacity to penetrate these interdiction bubbles. These bubbles have more than just a defensive role, since they make it possible to secure territories obtained through the policy of fait accompli, or to weaken buffer zones such as eastern Poland, the Baltic States and Finland. But they are becoming increasingly dangerous in other parts of the world, as they proliferate under the export strategies of Moscow and Beijing.
(1) Multifunction AESA radar leads a transformation of the battlefield sensors network, Dr D. Carlson, January 30 2015.
Here's the outline already, as well as the first part:
Intro
The RBE2-XG radar
- A multifunction antenna
- A French-style black program
- Electronic attack
- Self-protection and artificial intelligence
- The TR pod
- Towards the disappearance of pods
- Self-defence
- Air-to-ground capabilities
- Hypersonic
- Very high speed and stealth data links
- Remote effectors
- A UCAV heir to the NEURON
A generation 5++ Rafale
The Rafale's F5 standard is designed to keep IADS* and A2/AD at bay. French Air force doctrine is evolving rapidly and is seeking to revive the SEAD/DEAD capabilities abandoned 25 years ago with the withdrawal of the Jaguar. But, above all, by 2030 the Rafale will no longer have much to envy from the fifth-generation American aircraft, including the modernised versions due to come out from 2029. Although the Rafale originally set itself apart by replacing more than five combat aircraft, it is now expected to take its multi-mission logic to a new level for an aircraft being offered for export. According to our information, it will incorporate technologies that are currently only deployed on the most sensitive US aircraft (F-22, B-2, B-21 and RQ-180), apart from those developed for the sixth-generation aircraft.The RBE2-XG radar.
A multifunction antenna.
The arrival of AESA radars in the early 2000s revolutionised the art of air combat. Comprising almost a thousand transmitter/receivers (T/R modules), these radars were capable of searching for and tracking several dozen targets simultaneously, with superior resolution and range, and above all of resisting jamming techniques more effectively. At the end of June 2023, the DGA financed the programme to modernise the famous RBE2 fitted to the Rafale. This would, in fact, involve a totally disruptive new payload called the RBE2-XG (Extended Generation). This radar would not only be equipped with new gallium nitride (GaN) T/R modules, but also with a new digital architecture that would boost its performance tenfold and enable it to become a truly multifunctional sensor/effector. Several sources of information give us a clearer idea of the capabilities that the RB2-XG would bring to the F5 Rafale. Communications from Thales's competitors, such as Raytheon, Northrop and Saab in the field of airborne radars equipped with GaN modules and digital architecture, point to increased performance (range and resolution multiplied by 70%, volume covered by 5) to enable non-stealth aircraft to increase their firing capabilities. But Douglas J. Carlson, vice-president of Macom, the American supplier of GaN modules for military radars, mentions, in 2015 in the magazine Military Embeded Systems, new functionalities that are even more disruptive (1). Namely, the antenna's multifunctional capability, thanks to the scale of the bandwidth processed. While this may make it possible to resist enemy jamming tactics with a tenfold increase in frequency hopping speed, and therefore in the stealth of its transmissions, the multifunction capability would above all make it possible to carry out several tasks simultaneously, such as surveillance of the air and ground situation, extremely directional (and therefore difficult to intercept) high-speed data links with wing drones and ISR platforms, or even electronic attack missions from a safe distance, thanks to the power of both the transmitted signal and its shaping. But the level of miniaturisation offered by these new antennae would also make it possible to integrate these capabilities into remote platforms, such as UAVs or missiles, to form a genuine high-speed distributed network between weapon systems, enabling its end-effectors to carry out high value-added missions in the most contested areas.A French-style black program
This theme of a multifunction radar structures many of the scientific publications by Thales experts in the field, such as Stéphane Kemkemian and Jean-François Degurse (Multirole Airborne Radar Computer Evolution, International Radar Conference IEEE 2014. CROWN Project, Toward a European Multifunction AESA System, Conference Paper IEEE 2022). The radar would also be combined with an onboard supercomputer to automate the classification of threats using artificial intelligence algorithms (On the Use of CPGPU Computing for Space-Time Adaptive Processing on Airborne Systems, Conference Paper IEEE 2019). The CROWN project mentioned here seems to be structuring since it refers to the PEA won by Thales and Selex in November 2014, to produce a multifunction sensor as part of the Franco-British FCAS programme, which preceded the SCAF. Another document, much more informal this time, demonstrates Thales' very high level of industrial maturity on these issues. Last April, a young retiree, Yves Mancuzo, who specialised in T/R modules and was formerly a colleague of the researchers mentioned above, presented a 117-plate document entitled "Circuits et systèmes radiofréquence pour la défense" (Radio frequency circuits and systems for defence) to the Amicale des Anciens de Thales (AICPRAT). The audience was stunned to discover the extent of the electronics group's work on the subject and, above all, the catalogue of GaN components (free of any ITAR constraints) produced by the European foundry UMS which, integrated into land, naval or air platforms, cover all the frequency ranges of threats from 30 MHz to 60 GHz. These ranges are used by tactical radios, GNSS systems, all radars and jammers, right up to strategic SATCOMs.————-
*As an introduction to the "Rafale F5" dossier, the magazine has devoted a detailed article to Russian (and Chinese) Integrated Air Defense Systems. Here’s the intro (i could post a full translation if any of you are interested):
A2/AD and IADS: a little-known threat
(intro) Before looking at the many technological breakthroughs offered by the new Rafale, it is worth going back to the reason for the need for it, namely the growing risk associated with IADS. The conflict in Ukraine and the tensions in the China Sea have shown that Western air superiority is being challenged by the return of high-intensity warfare, which is characterised by a massification of equipment, an acceleration of tempo, a narrowing of the technological gap with the adversary and, finally, increasing recourse to connectivity between weapons systems in order to multiply their effects. In this area, Russian and Chinese air defence capabilities have now reached such a level that the A2/AD bubbles that make them up are now structured by a highly complex integrated system (IADS) that coordinates, reinforces and protects them. Only the United States still has the capacity to penetrate these interdiction bubbles. These bubbles have more than just a defensive role, since they make it possible to secure territories obtained through the policy of fait accompli, or to weaken buffer zones such as eastern Poland, the Baltic States and Finland. But they are becoming increasingly dangerous in other parts of the world, as they proliferate under the export strategies of Moscow and Beijing.
(1) Multifunction AESA radar leads a transformation of the battlefield sensors network, Dr D. Carlson, January 30 2015.
Electronic warfare
Electronic attack
The document also shows that the RB2-XG modules are optimised to operate not only in X-band but also in Ku- and K-band. This would enable the Rafale to incapacitate, over long distances, not only the radars of other aircraft and the designation radars of IADS, but also the terrain-following radars of strategic bombers and missiles. In addition, all the RBE2-XG's competitors emphasise its ability to act as a directed energy weapon. This is an area in which Thales has always been a centre of expertise. In 2013, Lockheed Martin told Defence News that the F-35's future GaN radar would be a veritable "frying pan" capable of damaging the components of opposing systems thanks to the power of its microwave radiation. But the structure of the (French) air force's new employment doctrine is resolutely focused on neutralising interdiction bubbles by means of SEAD/DEAD missions, both to maintain its ability to enter a hostile theatre first, and to keep in check the fait accompli policies that threaten not only European borders and the EEZ, but also freedom of maritime movement in the Asia/Pacific region. In July 2022, the French Air Force published two documents in quick succession, first a forecast and then a doctrine, announcing its desire to reconstitute its SEAD capabilities. Since the withdrawal of the DEAD Martel missile in 1999, and of its Jaguars, France, like other European nations, has subcontracted this mission to the US Navy's F-18 Growler. The naval air arm does, of course, have the SCALP missile at its disposal if necessary, but given the number of threats deployed, the 'Cost to Kill' of this munition seems inappropriate. The ability to enter areas where the magnetic environment is extremely degraded (multi-frequency jamming mentioned above) is essential to our armies' freedom of action, especially when the ROEM systems are degraded by the adversary. The doctrine document, published on 22 July, also mentions the possibility of using collaborative jamming capabilities in the future. For General Depardon, a specialist in this field, this approach is entirely relevant: the density of Russian, and probably Chinese, IADS systems effectively requires the use of unmanned remote sensors and effectors, as illustrated by the NEURON and other concepts of 'Loyal Wingman' or 'Remote carriers'. The aim is to map enemy assets in contested space in a given zone from a safe distance and in near real time. They can then be neutralised in a synchronised way to have a lasting impact on their cooperation network, bearing in mind that these remote effectors could also be powerful means of self-protection for the group. The electronic attack capabilities of the RBE2-XG, which also offer the technology to produce an anti-radar version of a missile already deployed for DEAD missions, are not incompatible with the development of the Rafale's survivability capabilities and its SPECTRA reconnaissance and self-protection system. In fact, this seems highly likely, because with the development of software-defined RF resources, the waveforms of adversary weapon systems, which were once well documented, have not only increased in number but, above all, have become radically more complex.Self-protection and artificial intelligence
An intimate understanding of these data is an imperative for both self-protection and offensive jamming systems. Some Big Data 'Pure Players', such as Germany's Helsing, associated with Saab on the German Typhoon electronic warfare systems, are promoting their ability to carry out predictive analyses to neutralise unprecedented waveforms. But for Colonel Michel, a former expert in an electronic warfare squadron, this is pure marketing: "these solutions operate in air-conditioned data-centers on the ground, with considerable logistical and computing requirements. What's more, the bandwidth needed to repatriate data from new-generation sensors is, for the moment, science fiction. The only solution is to have on-board automatic processing capabilities based on the ability to sample in real time the frequency bands used by all the threats identified, i.e. almost a 30 GHz spectrum". It would therefore come as no surprise if SPECTRA were also to be equipped with new GaN antennae, such as the RBE2-XG, to provide a greater volume of surveillance and jamming. It also has its own on-board super-computer to cope with the complexity and multiplicity of enemy waveforms. By working together, radar and electronic warfare systems would provide a vast self-protection bubble, not only for an entire patrol, but above all by including wing drones operating inside interdiction bubbles.
Optronics
The TR pod
Underneath the aircraft, the Areos reconnaissance pod (Reco-NG) and the Talios designation pod (TArgeting Long range Identification Optronic System) will merge their capabilities within the new TR (Targeting and Recce) pod. This development has been eagerly awaited by specialists, given the disruption caused by the basic version of the Talios and its options, which encroached on the Reco-NG. Since its launch, the Reco-NG pod has been a victim of its sensor's performance. The data harvest was such that it took the Air Force's photo interpreters (IP) more than 5 days to process the results. Although this deadline was extended to 48 hours in some cases, the time lag was still too great given the extreme mobility of the Russian and Chinese IADS systems. The Talios, on the other hand, opts for a short loop. In a first pass, it can produce a panorama (or stitching) by superimposing its visible colour and high-resolution infrared channels. But above all, it is capable of automatically recognising and geo-locating ground targets thanks to its own computer and on-board AI. As a result, pilots can immediately make a second pass to neutralise them, using either its designation laser or that of the Sophie camera fitted to commandos on the ground, which sends the coordinates of targets of interest directly to the pod via a data link. This cooperation with special forces is also enhanced by the fact that the Talios is able to use another laser to designate a target that it cannot reach with its weapons. A laser that is only visible in the light amplifiers of the French paratroopers so as not to betray the radio silence. Finally, let's not forget that the Talios is also capable of advanced aerial missions. Its MWIR (Middle Wave Infra Red) sensor is capable of unobtrusively (because it's passive) viewing thrusters at a distance of almost 200 km, and of tracking several targets simultaneously, whether on the ground or in the air, fixed or mobile. Finally, by exploiting the wavelength of the telemetry laser operating at 1.5 µm, it is possible to activate a SWIR (Short Wave Infra Red) mode to image and characterise the profiles of enemy aircraft, even stealthy ones, or camouflaged vehicles.Towards the disappearance of pods
Ultimately, pods are destined to disappear for the SCAF, since they will be an activatable function, as the F-35's EOTS already offers. The aircraft will be equipped with a single large-diameter lens, like the 300mm aperture lens on the Areos pod. As the mirror is achromatic, it will be easy to switch from the visible to the infrared, and above all to avoid any loss on the laser. The result, for a similar price, will be a tenfold increase in performance by doubling the range and sensitivity, and a fourfold increase in the flux collected, and therefore the accuracy of identification. Located at the rear of the radar antenna, the Rafale's OSF (Optics Frontal) unit is made up of two elements: the IRST for wide-field vision, and the LRF dedicated to narrow-field vision. For the IRST, and at the request of the Indian customer, Thales has proposed an upgrade based on a third-generation MWIR array, with different scanning modes for stitching (or Step and Store) like the Talios. For the F5 Rafale, the challenge is to enable the LRF to carry over 100 km to engage an aerial target with a MICA-NG missile without resorting to radar for situations where RF discretion is required. Thanks to its very high resolution, telemetry now offers an identification channel that can keep decoys in check, and track certain stealth platforms such as the Su-57 and the J-20. Pod TR and OSF are natively developed to operate in coordination with the RBE2-XG, enabling crews to benefit from multi-spectral vision to access consolidated intelligence on the tactical situation without intermediaries, and thus avoid deception techniques. /deepl
The F4.2 upgrade is pretty significant if news reports are to be believed. For example, the radar will be fully digital, a full generational upgrade over what's on the F-35 today, which is analog. While it's not GaN, it's still better than anything known flying in the West today. It will come with the ability to detect stealth jets via collaborative tactics.
It's also getting a new radio, which is a significant upgrade over the F-35. There are plenty of other upgrades that bring the jet on par with the F-35 or even surpasses it.
In any case, you should know that about 15 years ago, the French reported that we will see 2 different configurations of the Rafale after 2025, one would be an F5 version simply called Rafale NG for 2025, and an MLU version for 2030. Apparently, the NG version would come with airframe changes that the older Rafales cannot match, hence two different standards. The dates and expectations are slightly different, but it is what it is. The F4 can be treated as the MLU version, maybe the 4.3 can be. And the F5 with the new 2030 date is basically a less fancy version of the NG.
My hopes were dashed with the new F5 dates, but it doesn't change the fact that the F4 is still a very significant upgrade.
My only grouse, from the perspective of the IAF, is this:
‘Now fight connected’: why F4-standard Rafale is a game-changer for France
The French military is hailing a major advance with its Rafale combat aircraft, with the Dassault-built type poised to employ a raft of new operational capabilities.
www.flightglobal.com
If we start MRFA today, sign a contract in 2027 and get the first jet in 2030, assuming all 114 are F4, then we are already through with half the effective date by the time we get the first squadron. And by the time we get all 6 squadrons, we will have already crossed 10-15 years, making the purchase pointless, necessitating a very expensive upgrade program, the kind F-35 customers will be expected to do in just a few years after the B4 is ready.
But the point here is, with the F4.2, all those buying this version now, like the IN, and other export customers, will benefit from the upgrades until 2040, so it's good enough for existing jets. And it makes it more competitive with the F-35.
So there's no point in dissing a jet that's actually keeping to schedule. What you need to worry about is when the F-35 will catch up to the Rafale F5, 'cause it's coming out almost alongside the F-35 B4. It's not gonna be a good look for the US and LM if the Rafale ends up with a next gen avionics suite before the F-35.
_DC
Most reliable factor in Indian procurement is delays. We can count on it.
We can count on delays in signing Rafale M..
Delivery schedule on wait list of Dassault..
Then procurement of entire Rafale M.
Then going through MMRCA.
Oh..AMCA mk2 also will be delayed.. So it won't interfere.. .
AMCA mk1 will be treated like LCAmk1 as trainer of 5 th gen fighters.
The F4.2 upgrade is pretty significant if news reports are to be believed. For example, the radar will be fully digital, a full generational upgrade over what's on the F-35 today, which is analog. While it's not GaN, it's still better than anything known flying in the West today. It will come with the ability to detect stealth jets via collaborative tactics.
It's also getting a new radio, which is a significant upgrade over the F-35. There are plenty of other upgrades that bring the jet on par with the F-35 or even surpasses it.
In any case, you should know that about 15 years ago, the French reported that we will see 2 different configurations of the Rafale after 2025, one would be an F5 version simply called Rafale NG for 2025, and an MLU version for 2030. Apparently, the NG version would come with airframe changes that the older Rafales cannot match, hence two different standards. The dates and expectations are slightly different, but it is what it is. The F4 can be treated as the MLU version, maybe the 4.3 can be. And the F5 with the new 2030 date is basically a less fancy version of the NG.
My hopes were dashed with the new F5 dates, but it doesn't change the fact that the F4 is still a very significant upgrade.
My only grouse, from the perspective of the IAF, is this:
Badrinath describes the Rafale F4 as “a very effective aircraft, ready to realise any kind of mission. We have a product that is really ready for the next 10 to 15 years.”‘Now fight connected’: why F4-standard Rafale is a game-changer for France
The French military is hailing a major advance with its Rafale combat aircraft, with the Dassault-built type poised to employ a raft of new operational capabilities.
If we start MRFA today, sign a contract in 2027 and get the first jet in 2030, assuming all 114 are F4, then we are already through with half the effective date by the time we get the first squadron. And by the time we get all 6 squadrons, we will have already crossed 10-15 years, making the purchase pointless, necessitating a very expensive upgrade program, the kind F-35 customers will be expected to do in just a few years after the B4 is ready.
But the point here is, with the F4.2, all those buying this version now, like the IN, and other export customers, will benefit from the upgrades until 2040, so it's good enough for existing jets. And it makes it more competitive with the F-35.
So there's no point in dissing a jet that's actually keeping to schedule. What you need to worry about is when the F-35 will catch up to the Rafale F5, 'cause it's coming out almost alongside the F-35 B4. It's not gonna be a good look for the US and LM if the Rafale ends up with a next gen avionics suite before the F-35.
Most reliable factor in Indian procurement is delays. We can count on it.
We can count on delays in signing Rafale M..
Delivery schedule on wait list of Dassault..
Then procurement of entire Rafale M.
Then going through MMRCA.
Oh..AMCA mk2 also will be delayed.. So it won't interfere.. .
AMCA mk1 will be treated like LCAmk1 as trainer of 5 th gen fighters.
The delays are not good. A delay doesn't mean we will stop negotiations for the F4 and then start a new one for the F5.
The MRFA tender has some leeway based on the RFI. The IAF is willing to wait up to 5 years for their first squadron. So a signature in 2027 would mean an F5 delivery between 2031-32 is possible. But if the F5 is only gonna be ready by 2035, then negotiations will happen only for the F4. Even MMRCA negotiations were for the F3+, not F3R. So they can't change the version midway during the process. The IAF also needs to evaluate the technologies for the F5, which I'm sure is not flying yet.
Our only option is to delay MRFA by 3 years and procure 2 F4 squadrons in the meantime. Then in 3-4 years, the IAF can expand the scope of the contest to include even 5th gen jets. So Rafale F5, Su-57/75, F-35, KF-21 B2/3 etc.
2 IAF squadrons combined with 1 or 2 IN squadrons is enough to bring in at least 30-40% of the Rafale's parts production and a full assembly line to India. It's also more than enough to bring in most of the spares production and MRO facilities into India, it's after all 5-6 squadrons. The new MRFA can either bring in 6 new F5 squadrons or a whole new jet if they think it's tempting enough. Or they can scrap it and just buy 2 or 3 squadrons of F5 and complete the production line.
AMCA Mk2 will definitely be delayed, but Mk1 will be ready alongside F5. So breaking the Rafale contract into different batches will do the trick. We can compensate the need for more jets with Mk1 alone, as a stopgap for Mk2. 6 Rafale squadrons will easily meet the IAF's needs until Mk1.
The RBE2 XG will have impressive computing power, and there are two approaches to increasing this computing power:
- With GaN, the processing can be integrated into the antenna, so we have a massively parallel computer with one processor per T/R element, and the T/R and processor are cooled at the same time. All the calculations that depend on the T/R (which is a small radar) can be done at the same time instead of one after the other.
- But that's not enough: before Gan technology, multi-lane radar technology (which still seems to be a priority) will need large radar processing capacities, because:
- there will be more lanes to process
- they will have to be recombined,
- it will be possible to recombine them several times depending on the desensitisation and processing required.
For this last need, it seems that Thales is moving towards the solutions studied in CROWN. Indeed, Air&Cosmos reports a new architecture that would be derived from the multi-function sensor that Thales and Selex were to produce as part of the Franco-British FCAS, which itself refers to the CROWN project. So I looked for the CROWN abstract:
The project European active electronically scanned array with Combined Radar, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Communications (COMMs) functions for military applications, called CROWN, was launched in July 2021 under the European program of Preparatory Action for Defence Research (PADR) and Electromagnetic Spectrum Dominance Call. It responds to the need of designing and developing high-performance and very compact Multifunction RF systems. Multifunction systems, integrating several functions in only one single system, enable small platforms operating in the complex battlefield of high capabilities, able to adapt and react in real-time to the changing scenarios and working in collaborative way with other systems. Technological challenges are found in the development of broadband antennas, digital beam forming (DBF), smart resource management and compact transmit and receive modules. Other aspects at system level as architecture definition or modelling are also tackled within the project.
On the other hand the "supercomputer" that A&C are talking about refers to: "On the use of GPGPU computing for Space-Time Adaptive Processing on airborne systems" of which here is the abstract:
New generation radar systems offer both more frequency bandwidth and multi-channel receiving capability. This allows the use of advanced signal processing algorithms, which delivers a major performance leap, but the amount of data to be processed and the computational workload drastically increases. In the paper, we focus on Space-Time Adaptive Processing (STAP) which purpose is to remove ground echoes, in order to enhance slow moving target detection. The downside of STAP is its high computational cost. Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) processors are used for several years now to perform general purpose computing. Although not originally made for scientific computing, their high performance per watt efficiency on certain tasks makes it an ideal candidate for embedded radar systems where physical size and electrical consumption are very limited. We investigate the use of such processors for this application and compare their performances with classical general-purpose processor (CPU).
Finally, an older article allows us to understand where we want to go
"Multirole airborne radar computer evolution", here is the abstract:
The use of AESA antennas (Active Electronically Scanned Array) in airborne radars is a breakthrough in terms of operational capabilities, compared to classic radars working with PESA antennas (Passive Electronically Scanned Array). Multi-chanel receivers allow designers to use more complex and more sophisticated algorithms. Along with the improvements of RF sensors (Radio Frequency), we assist in a strong increase of sampling frequencies on the output of reception channels. These improvements lead to an important increase of computing power needed in numeric computers that operate on the received signals. In this article, we present an efficient solution in term of computer architecture, basing on few examples requiring a lot of computing capabilities such as the SAR-UHR (Synthetic Aperture Radar Ultra High Resolution), the ABF (Adaptive Beam Forming) and the STAP (Spatial Time Adaptive Processing).
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Weapons
Self-defence
The F5 will also see the replacement of the majority of its weapons, either by modernised or completely new delivery systems. Presented at Euronaval 2020, the MICA-NG will begin trials at the Biscarrosse site from 2023 and could enter production from 2026 to equip the Rafale F4. The progress made in recent years on its passive (infrared) and active (electromagnetic) homing systems, both in terms of performance and miniaturisation, makes this development possible. By taking up less space, the electronics enable the missile's dimensions and mass to be maintained, while carrying more fuel and a new "dual pulse" propellant. Its ability to engage a target beyond visual range could be around 100 km (IR version) and 130 km (EM version). While the new infrared arrays and the introduction of an AESA antenna provide superior resolution for targeting platforms with reduced thermal or electromagnetic radiation (UAVs, stealth aircraft), Thales's new electromagnetic self-director should not only have an extended range and greater resilience to adversary jamming systems, but above all far greater agility with discrete emission modes. It is for this reason that an improved version of this homing device will also equip the modernised Meteor which, with similar performance to the F-35's AIM-120D (Mach 4+, range in excess of 160 km), requires even more precise targeting capabilities (live or collaborative).Air/Ground capabilities
In terms of air/ground capabilities, the SCALP pre-strategic cruise missile with a range of 560 km, known for its extreme discretion (cruise flight less than 30 m from the ground), will be supplemented by the arrival of the MdCN (New Generation Cruise Missile). While the MdCN would have a smaller warhead, it would have a range of almost 1,000 km to meet the challenges posed by the new Russian S-500 system, whose interdiction bubble radius would, in some cases, exceed 700 km. But range is not the only new feature of the MdCN. While it also has an AESA autodirector, it could also be equipped with a LIDAR [Laser Imaging Detection And Ranging] system for 3D imaging of targets hidden under vegetation, for example, and a SATCOM system that would enable it to update the position of its targets using information from other combat or ISR platforms (drones, satellites, etc.). It is not known whether its AESA radar will be composed of AsGa or GaN modules. However, if the latter is the case, the MdCN, equipped with a multi-function antenna, would become a multi-role missile capable of handling the complex tactics of collaborative combat and anti-radar missions. The Rafale would then return to the SEAD/DEAD capabilities that disappeared with the Martel missile in 1999, but it would also supplant the American aircraft equipped with the AGM-88 HARM, of which even the latest version (AGM-88G), released in 2020, has a range of no more than 300 km. Finally, the F5 version of the Rafale Marine could also interact with the new anti-ship cruise missile that will replace the Scalp-EG, Exocet and Harpoon on French, British and Italian naval platforms. Supersonic (Mach 3+), with a range of 300 km, it will feature a retargeting function thanks to the RBE2-XG. This will give it greater interception capability against Fast Boats used by opposing commandos.Hypersonic
But above all, by 2035, the Rafale F5 will be fitted with the ASN4G hypersonic manoeuvring and multi-trajectory missile, which will replace the air-to-ground medium-range missile (ASMP) for missions linked to nuclear deterrence. The 4th Generation Air-to-Ground Nuclear missile, developed jointly by ONERA and MBDA as part of the Prométhée 1-2-3 PEAs, has faced several technological challenges since it was first developed more than 30 years ago, apart from its propulsion system. These include its piloting, control, mission system and, above all, its stealth. While the design and the discretion of the materials used in terms of SER (Surface Equivalent Radar) had, above all, to be compatible with the severity of the environments undergone (accelerations, vibrations, temperatures), it was above all necessary to solve the problem of the data links that could be absorbed by the plasma created around the vector at very high speed. /deepl
(last part)
At a time when several countries active in European defence are choosing to fall under the American umbrella by acquiring the F-35, in order to be able to deliver their tactical nuclear weapons, we can legitimately question the relevance of such a choice for 2030. After all, the Rafale F5 is resolutely a force multiplier in terms of its new kinetic and cognitive capabilities. These unprecedented competitive advantages on the export market should enable us to rapidly expand the Rafale customer club, which will be in a position, with new or upgraded aircraft, to upset the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, Central Europe and South-East Asia. All the more so because, unlike its American rival, the Rafale is in no way an instrument of subjugation, but rather a tool of sovereignty, at the service of strategic autonomy and freedom of action. /deepl
notes:
(2) http://www.baesystems.com/en-us/definition/mosaic-warfare
(3) Loi No 2023-703 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2024 à 2030 et portant diverses dispositions intéressant la défense
(4) La furtivité du drone NEURON à l’essai avec des Eurofighters espagnols, Air&Cosmos, 4 janvier 2019
(5) Le RQ-180: tout voir pour tout savoir, Air&Cosmos, 22 décembre 2022
… et voilà.
Collaborative combat
Very high-speed stealth data links
The prerequisite for collaborative combat is a new generation of very high-speed data links that will increase the number of connections between platforms and their sensors, enabling ISR, command and strike missions to be deployed without distance or reaction time. By multiplying the number of interconnected platforms, it is now possible to detect, track, target and neutralise a threat using platforms several hundred kilometres apart, in an ultra-secure way. Until now, within NATO, Link 16 has enabled air platforms to be interconnected, allowing commanders to monitor developments in the tactical situation in real time and crews on the same patrol to share the same information. However, as part of the American doctrine of "Mosaic Warfare" (2), which seeks to respond to the complexity of IADS networks, the choice has been made to set up local networks with much greater bandwidth, capable of sharing the gigantic flows created by the new generations of sensors, multiplying the number of players interacting by a factor of 100, but also preserving the confidentiality of certain exchanges. While the F-35 and B-21 share the MADL link, the F-22 and B-2 share the FIDL link. These are data links operating at higher frequencies, with greater bandwidth and, above all, a much more directional beam to avoid being intercepted and/or jammed. In this area, the Rafale F5 will have FOD3 and IVD4 (Inter Vehicule Data Link) links, which will put it on a par with the F-35 in the export market. But it should also have a SATCOM antenna with a diameter of just 20 cm, based on GaN modules and operating in Ka band (26.5-40 GHz), to benefit here too from increased directivity and throughput. According to Electropribort's latest annual report, the Russians do not yet have permanent solutions for jamming these frequencies, due to the technical difficulties encountered in developing the associated travelling wave tubes. Ultimately, the capabilities of this new SATCOM link should make it possible to integrate the space segment into collaborative combat. It is not just a question of connecting to the Syracuse 4 satellites, but also of being linked to the optical (CSO) or SIGINT (CÉRÈS) intelligence satellites, to reinforce the capabilities of a patrol, both in terms of surface area covered and real-time alerts. On this point too, we need to respond to Russia. With the arrival of its Gerakle ('Hercules') network of relay satellites, Russia will soon be able to send, in real time, the firing coordinates obtained by its SAR/SIGINT Liana constellation to land, air and naval platforms capable of firing the Iskander, Kinjal and Tsirkon hypersonic missiles.Remote effectors
Two AEPs, Sésame and Carthage, have also structured the use of remote effectors, such as the Remote Carriers made by MBDA, which come in two different models. The RC 100 is 1.80 m long and weighs 120 kg. It is directly derived from the new Smart Glider weapon family. The RC 200 is more imposing at 2.80 m and 240 kg. Operating in packs, exchanging information to share roles, the role of these Remote Carriers is not just to enter a contested or totally scrambled space to overwhelm opposing defences with deception or strike tactics. They are also designed to use their optical sensors to detect hidden surveillance or tracking radars, and to use angular sensors to identify the characteristics of the enemy's sensors in order to optimise the RBE2-XG's electronic attacks. According to the animated film presented by the DGA at the recent Paris Air Show, the F5 could carry eight of these platforms.A UCAV heir to the NEURON
But the big surprise came last June, when the government passed an amendment stipulating that the F5 standard would be supplemented by the development of an escort UAV based on the NEURON demonstrator (3). At the time, this UCAV demonstrator impressed the DGA with its performance. Developed by Dassault using its own funds from 1999 onwards, then financed by several European countries from 2006 onwards (Sweden, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Greece), the NEURON carried out 123 test flights between 2012 and 2015. Then, a new campaign in 2018-19, designed to study its performance in terms of radar and infrared stealth, will pit it against the Spanish Eurofighter (4). Although the Adour MK 951 engine will have to be replaced to give it a range of over 100 nautical miles, its confirmed stealth qualities, its belly bay capable of carrying two 250 kg guided bombs and its general design give us a glimpse of some of its future missions. It is not known whether it will be capable of air-to-air missions. On the other hand, it is certain that its mission, while awaiting the SCAF, will be to penetrate interdiction bubbles, not to 'peel the onion' of air defences as the Remote Carriers will do, but rather to strike high value-added targets in depth, either by kinetic means or by electronic attack, capitalising on the effectors already produced for the F5. Depending on the source, between two and four UCAVs of this type could accompany each Rafale. Less costly to produce than a combat aircraft, it could rapidly increase an air force's capabilities tenfold, without risking the lives of its crews. This is a point on which the French offer should particularly stand out against the F-35, which will not have any wing UAVs to enable it to deal with Russian, Chinese or Iranian saturation capabilities. These missions are assigned to the B-2, B-21 and R.Q-180, which are by their very nature non-exportable (5).At a time when several countries active in European defence are choosing to fall under the American umbrella by acquiring the F-35, in order to be able to deliver their tactical nuclear weapons, we can legitimately question the relevance of such a choice for 2030. After all, the Rafale F5 is resolutely a force multiplier in terms of its new kinetic and cognitive capabilities. These unprecedented competitive advantages on the export market should enable us to rapidly expand the Rafale customer club, which will be in a position, with new or upgraded aircraft, to upset the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, Central Europe and South-East Asia. All the more so because, unlike its American rival, the Rafale is in no way an instrument of subjugation, but rather a tool of sovereignty, at the service of strategic autonomy and freedom of action. /deepl
notes:
(2) http://www.baesystems.com/en-us/definition/mosaic-warfare
(3) Loi No 2023-703 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2024 à 2030 et portant diverses dispositions intéressant la défense
(4) La furtivité du drone NEURON à l’essai avec des Eurofighters espagnols, Air&Cosmos, 4 janvier 2019
(5) Le RQ-180: tout voir pour tout savoir, Air&Cosmos, 22 décembre 2022
… et voilà.