Update on operations in Ukraine 5 April 2022
General situation
Russian forces have withdrawn rapidly from all of northern Ukraine except, probably temporarily, for a strip of land north of Sumy. They are holding ground as much as possible in the southwest and are making a special effort in the north of the Donbass with the hope of taking Severodonetsk and Sloviansk.
Specific situations
North
General withdrawal of the Russian forces. The manoeuvre was rather well organised by the Russian northern staff, but at the cost of significant losses.
Southwest
Maintenance of positions by reduced Russian forces. The 20th Motorised Division in position in front of Kherson was reportedly particularly hard hit. At worst, Russian forces could withdraw to the Dnieper line and defend the Kherson bridgehead.
Donbass
Confusion in Mariupol: images of 200 Ukrainian soldiers being taken prisoner were released. However, the Russian forces, also very weakened, seem to be marking time. If the capture of the city still seems close, it is likely that the 150th DM will not be able to be re-engaged later. Worse, it was possible that it would be necessary to draw on the few Russian reserves, to the detriment of the North Donbass, to reinforce it and take Mariupol as quickly as possible.
Still effort of the 2nd CA LNR on Popasna and Rubizhne and of the 3rd Russian DM on Severdonetsk. Preparations for the 20th Army's attack on Sloviansk, whose inhabitants were invited to leave by the Ukrainian authorities.
Operations in central Donbass, opposite Donetsk and on the southern border were also halted. It is nevertheless on this side that the prospects are most interesting for the Russians and the 1st DNR CA, but they are visibly lacking in resources.
Prospects
The battle of the Donbass is now probably the decisive battle of the war. It is unlikely that the Russian side will consider a cease-fire before the end of April and the outcome of the battle.
If the two Donbass provinces, including Mariupol, are conquered, the Russians will be able to declare themselves victorious by 9 May, even if this will undoubtedly be a much smaller victory than envisaged.
If not, i.e. if they find it impossible to take the Donbass, perhaps they will consider a "tactical ceasefire" in order to freeze the situation while reconstituting their forces for a subsequent large-scale offensive.
Ukrainian manoeuvring possibilities are limited, but real, with several brigades released from operations in the north and west, where the threat of an offensive from Belarus no longer seems relevant. They could be engaged in the south-west but could not go beyond the Dnieper. Above all, they can reinforce the Donbass front and make the possibility of a Russian victory in this region even more difficult before the end of the month.
Notes
The Oryx destruction report (necessarily underestimated) indicates a significant increase in Russian combat vehicle losses (+230 tanks and armoured infantry vehicles in one week, i.e. +50%). This is explained by the discovery of wrecks in the liberated areas but also by the heavy losses suffered in the Donbass. At the same time, there are only 22 Ukrainian tanks and armoured vehicles listed.
There is talk of a Russian "hidden mobilisation" to commit 60,000 active military personnel, such as military academy officers, and new volunteers to Ukraine. These individual commitments to fill gaps, not to build up new forces, give an indication of the very high level of casualties. The Wagner company now accepts everyone.
Given the tonnage being sent to Russia by Russian soldiers returning from northern Ukraine via the Belarusian post, it is possible that the already strained logistics will be further strained by the scale of looting.
Stratégie et tactique.
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