Ukraine - Russia Conflict
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L’art opératif à l’épreuve de la guerre en Ukraine – 3. La fabrique des batailles
The operative art to the test of the war in Ukraine - 3. The factory of battles
The operative art consists in shaping and operating military resources in coherent sets called "campaigns" in order to achieve strategic objectives. A single campaign can sometimes suffice for this, and this was the hope of the Russians with their high-speed offensive of February-March. In reality, several campaigns are often needed, which follow one another in time or overlap, always in the same form or not.
Thus, in Ukraine, there were two successive Russian offensive land campaigns of different forms to which two antagonistic defensive campaigns responded. There is also a naval campaign and a campaign of Russian strikes in the great depths which continue and to which Ukrainian defensive and offensive campaigns also respond.
In parallel with these campaigns in empty space, and one could add the one in cyberspace, we are now witnessing the development of a Ukrainian air-land offensive campaign. It is likely that this will not be the last.
The bricks of the battles
Ukraine was only able to go on the offensive because its ground forces had been sufficiently built up to allow this. A build-up is always qualitative and/or quantitative.
Qualitatively, it is about having combat units that are of a higher tactical range than the unit on the various points of contact. A point of contact on the ground is the area where, with its weapons, you can shoot directly effectively on the enemy. In Ukraine, this corresponds roughly to a tactical confrontation on a few square kilometers. Numerical superiority is of little importance at this scale, where it almost never exceeds 2 to 1. Qualitative superiority, on the other hand, is essential.
The value of equipment is obviously important, but apart from the fact that in Ukraine this equipment is often quite similar on both sides, it is the human factors - fire resistance, skills, command, organization - that really make the difference in this deadly environment. External factors, such as terrain or fire support, accentuate or compensate for the difference in tactical range between the adversaries, and in the end, the one with the highest level systematically wins, more than proportionally to this difference. Note that this tactical range can also evolve according to the shape of the campaigns. A light unit that is well suited to area defense and guerrilla warfare may be less competent and suited to a positional battle where the enemy has powerful artillery.
Quantitatively, the aim is to have as many combat units as possible, and if possible more than the enemy. While numerical superiority is of little importance at the tactical level, it is very important at the campaign level. If the French Army of today were to be pitted against the 1990 Army after mobilization, it is likely that the 1990 Army would win. The French Army of 2022 would win most of the battles but would probably be outnumbered by the 1990 Army, which, because it is more numerous, would be able to multiply the number of battles and, above all, to maneuver in places where its opponent could not be. Let us note that these two criteria are partially contradictory. When, for a given amount of resources, one invests a lot of resources in the strength of each combat unit, especially with very sophisticated equipment, one reduces the number of units one can afford.
Over time, as we have seen, the Ukrainian army has achieved superiority in both areas, with the flow of several tens of thousands of newly trained soldiers, a figure higher than that of the final losses - dead, seriously wounded, prisoners and missing - and the growth in competence of the units engaged whether maneuver or, above all, territorial. In short, the Ukrainian army has about sixty brigades of varying quality, but they are quite good and, in any case, on average superior to Russian units. It is difficult to estimate the number of Russian and separatist groupings by comparison, especially since these groupings have become very disparate. It can be considered that it now represents a mass of maneuver inferior in volume and average tactical quality to that of the Ukrainians. This tactical inferiority can still be compensated for locally by relying on entrenched positions and artillery that is still far superior in volume.
It is indeed to compensate for this general inferiority without hope of reversal by the way of recruitment of only volunteers that a partial mobilization was decided in Russia. It was carried out in parallel with an accelerated political process of transforming the conquered territories and the separatist republics into Russian lands. From the moment of fighting on Russian soil, conscripts already in the army can be engaged immediately, that is to say, a potential of several tens of thousands of slightly trained men for the ground forces. Mobilized reservists can also be deployed as individual reinforcements or in formed battalions, which in this case will necessarily take months.
The hope is clearly to boost the volume of Russian forces engaged in Ukraine, at the risk of a clear reduction in an already insufficient average quality. The posture is clearly defensive in the short term, with the aim of securing the conquests by holding on to the terrain, even with mediocre troops, before the autumn rains and the "season of bad roads" (Rasputy) which handicap all offensive operations. It will then be time to proceed with a qualitative improvement of units and perhaps consider a winter or spring offensive. On the Ukrainian side, it is a question of gathering, activating and logistically supplying groups of brigades in order to organize the maximum of offensive battles before this deadline.
Battles
At the moment, people's minds are focused on the ongoing battle in the north-east of Ukraine. It is taking place in several areas.
The first is the Oskil River, on a north-south axis, along the four crossing points. The brigades that have conquered the area are spread over these points, with the hope at best of establishing bridgeheads from which to maneuver later, or at worst to fix the maximum number of Russian units, because the Russians have obviously decided to resist on the river. For the Ukrainians, the most important opportunities are north of this line in the Dvorichna area.
The second space is north of the towns of Sloviansk and Seversk, along the Donets River and the forest area of the Sviati Hory National Park, a general west-east axis. There are probably four brigades pushing northward, putting pressure on the town of Lyman held by two battalions of Russian operational reserve BARS and two Cossack battalions under the leadership of the Russian 2nd Army. In addition to a gradual advance, all this pressure also made it possible to fix scarce Russian forces there.
The main and perhaps decisive effort is between the two spaces, between the Oskil River and the Sviati Hory National Park. There are still four brigades, including at least one armored brigade, facing what remains of the Russian 90th Armored Division. The Russian 90th Armored Division resisted and sometimes counterattacked, but the Ukrainian grouping managed to advance Ridkodub and Nove and formed a new pocket. It is very possible that this breakthrough will lead to another major Russian retreat, either in Lyman or on the Oskil River.
Faced with the general Ukrainian push, the Russian 2nd and 41st Armies, no doubt fed by reinforcements from the Belgorod area of the 6th and 1st Tank Armies are trying to reform a solid front. Meanwhile, the Russians are continuing their attacks in the area between Lysysyshansk and Horlivka, probably to counter the Ukrainian offensive beyond the Donets River, but also again and again for the past three months to seize Bakhmut, 50 km southeast of Kramatorsk. Limited fighting is also still going on in the Donetsk region. The logic of this effort, which has absorbed resources that would have been more useful for the defense of the north, is now unclear, but perhaps it is simply a matter of trying to achieve a victory.
At the other end of the font, third battle, the siege of the bridgehead of Kherson continues, a siege the size of a French department, with all the difficulties and prospects of the exercise. The area is solidly held by twelve Russian brigades/regiments averaging 1,500 men, with a total of 150-200 battle tanks and 800 infantry fighting vehicles, supported by about 250-300 artillery pieces including perhaps 80 LRMs. The Ukrainian forces are only slightly larger in size, but they have the capability to launch small local attacks on the three areas of advance in the north, center, and extreme south. It is not out of the question that the Ukrainians will attempt an amphibious operation on the peninsula of the Biloberezhia Sviatoslava National Park south of Kherson.
The bulk of the effort is in the interdiction campaign by long-range artillery and the increasingly present Ukrainian air force. This interdiction campaign, which primarily hits depots and logistical axes, especially on the Dnieper, isolates Russian forces beyond the river with little prospect of improvement for them. In the general context of a Russian defensive campaign, military logic would suggest evacuating the area to take advantage of the protection of the river and redeploying forces to other threatened regions. Political logic dictates that at least the city of Kherson should remain under Russian control and that the possibility of a new attack towards Odessa should be kept open. In the strategic dialogue, the political level must have the last word, but by ignoring military realities too much, it risks disaster. The much-vaunted Slavic resilience also has its limits, and it is not clear that the Russian soldiers isolated beyond the Dnieper await the autumn rains and the harshness of winter with the same enthusiasm as the others. If nothing else changes, the continuation of the battle beyond the Dnieper presents great risks of disaster for the Russians.
And then, there is the battle X, the one that the Ukrainians may have the prospect of organizing behind the front line thanks to their numerical and qualitative superiority and assuming that they have adequate logistics. To have an idea of its volume, it would be necessary to count the number of brigades that are not in line.
This battle X can be the exploitation of the breakthrough between Oskil and Lyman, heading east. Operational art is often the organization of the conquest of key points, and in this region the capture of Svatove and then 50 km further east of Starobilsk would completely negate the results of the Russian invasion in the region and force Russian logistics to largely bypass the area to supply the forces in DNR/LNR.
Battle X could also be an attack on the vast area from the Dnieper south of Zaporizhia to the DNR, with Orikhiv, Hulipole or Vouhledar as the point of effort. The Russian-held part of the Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts is occupied by several Russian armies with the 58th in the front line, but just as the pressure on Kherson had drawn Russian forces into the southern part of the theater of operations, the Ukrainians may be waiting for their successes in the north to force them to clear the south this time. This is the advantage of having the superiority in numbers of good maneuver units. In any case, another victorious Ukrainian battle could be, if not decisive, then at least have important consequences. It remains to be seen whether they are able to organize and conduct it in time.
At this stage, we do not see how there could be an offensive battle initiated by the Russians, of the size of the Ukrainians' battle in the northeast, for example, which involves a dozen brigades.
As we said, the campaigns can be successive or superimposed. In parallel and rather above these ground battles, there is the campaign to know who can engage the most objects in the sky above the battlefields, whether they are planes, drones, helicopters and even shells. A campaign in which, while the two air fleets are in opposition, the rarity of aerial combat should be noted. This campaign has a very important technical content, and it is perhaps in this field that Western aid can be most useful. Anything that can neutralise the enemy's anti-aircraft defence, such as the AGM-88 anti-radar missiles recently supplied by the Americans, can also facilitate the use of its own aircraft or projectiles, in direct support or interdiction. Conversely, anything that can counter the threat of enemy aircraft and missiles, such as the promised NASAMS batteries and perhaps one day the excellent French SAMP/T Mamba, facilitates ground manoeuvres and thus the success of battles. It is not clear in what way the capture of numerous sensitive Russian equipment, radars, electronic warfare, transmission vehicles, after the Balakliya victory can influence this campaign, which is essential for the continuation of the war.
The establishment in Ukraine of an anti-aircraft defense as impervious as that of Israel, for example, could avoid this dangerous escalation that arises when one feels powerless on the battlefield but has the means to strike the country and its people. The paralysis of civilian communication networks, in every sense of the word, can have an effect on several functions of the operational art, logistics, command, maneuver. Strikes on populations, directly or on what allows them to live, whether knowingly or by assumed clumsiness, in order to undermine the will of the people and to force the leaders to negotiate, or even to capitulate, have not been very successful in history. To persist in doing so because it is simply possible and because one does not know what else to do is akin to war criminality on the part of the Russians. It also encourages the Ukrainian adversary to do the same, such as the strikes on the city of Donetsk, and thus causes a terrible spiral.
In summary, the campaigns of the end of the summer are to the advantage of the Ukrainians who undoubtedly have the initiative. They have had enough effect to bring about a radical change in Russian organic strategy, the one that generates and organizes the means. A radical change with effects that are still largely uncertain for the continuation of operations.
Well they should, because without working NBC suits, making the battlefield radioactive places them at a disadvantage.
In other news:
Putin allies bashed Russia's retreat from a city in Ukraine, calling military leaders 'garbage' and saying they should be sent 'barefoot with machine guns straight to the front'
After Russian troops retreated from Lyman, a Ukrainian city Putin claimed was part of Russia, powerful Putin supporters ripped military leadership.
Kherson is starting to collapse. I think Pooty won't have a choice but to stomach the loss of all east/southeast and Kherson Oblast. However even though Pooty has been threatening nukes from the beginning I think once Ukraine forces reaches Crimean "border" that is when sht will start getting real. I think US/NATO is going to sound the alarm that Pooty has started moving tactical nukes for a possible use and when that happens you may find some of the Euro nations saying enough. A huge test is coming soon for NATO nations and EU.
I think Turkey should allow NATO ships into the Black sea at that point.
I think Turkey should allow NATO ships into the Black sea at that point.
Any attack on Crimean peninsula is a certain Nuking by Russia. Rusdia cannot defend Crimea in a conventional war, if UA starts offense over crimea. And putin cannot loose crimea not even in wildest & badest nightmare, Russia will use nuke for sure.
Question is what will be NATO's response for a nuke attack by Russia.
@BMD @vstol Jockey
Crimea has been attacked many times I'm talking about an actual invasion with armored mechanize brigades. Once Ukraine reaches Crimean border they are going to shell it and HiMARS the hell out of it before any decision to send in troops. They may even finally take out the Crimean bridge.
I think Ukraine is actually taking it slow with Kherson east of the Dnieper and using it as a Snake Island II, i.e. seeing how many assets the dumb SOBs will send there to be destroyed before finally giving up.
I don't think it is. Deep down, Putin knows he has pushed his luck with the annexation of Ukraine. I wouldn't be surprised if Putin is gone before Ukraine reaches that point though. The mobilised addition is bound to slow things down and maybe reverse them for a period. There are going to be lots of Russian bodies, and leadership pundits were furious that they sent people with families and jobs, precisely because it knows that the missing will be missed, and that will affect Putin's ability to continue as
In short, it looks like a break in the northern front in Kherson. There are 2 UA brigades in action on the 15 km wide attack lane - the mobile BZmot and one armored or BZ. So about 10 AU battalions. The RUS forces that were there were less than a regiment. It looks good
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