Ukraine - Russia Conflict
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They always spam cruise missiles to cover up massive defeats.
No, it's legit.
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"Russia Forever" sign in Kherson. 
An officer of the #Russian Armed Forces from the Siberian village of Srosty - Safonov Sergey Anatolyevich, was killed during the fighting on the territory of #Ukraine . On 10/18/22, during the fighting in Ukraine, a serviceman of the RF Armed Forces was killed - Viktor Sergeevich Tretyakov, born on 12/04/1996.
An officer of the #Russian Armed Forces from the Siberian village of Srosty - Safonov Sergey Anatolyevich, was killed during the fighting on the territory of #Ukraine . On 10/18/22, during the fighting in Ukraine, a serviceman of the RF Armed Forces was killed - Viktor Sergeevich Tretyakov, born on 12/04/1996.
They have to defend cities and towns, but that doesn't make them non-civilian areas.
They know exactly where to target too, there's only one bridge and ferry area.
Crazy to think that Russia has lost 2/3rds to 3/4 of that territory now. And they already had the Donbass area pre-February. So they are about 75% defeated at this point.
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Ukraine's R18 drone credited with inflicting $130 million in Russian army losses
Ukraine's Aerorozvidka drone unit claims its R18 grenade-dropping drone has inflicted $130 million in material damages to Russian forces.
dronedj.com
Kremlin speaker Peskov says that their war goals in Ukraine can be achieved through peaceful negotiations, but those "now impossible due to the position of the Ukrainian side."
Point de situation du 11 novembre 2022
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Update of the situation on 11 November 2022
The Russian command has just announced the withdrawal of all its forces to the left of the Dnieper. More precisely, Vladimir Putin accepted the proposal, which must have been quite old, of his generals to withdraw the 49th Army and the 22nd Army Corps from this untenable position. Perhaps he was thoughtful enough to wait until after the US elections so as not to offer an indirect victory to Joe Biden's Ukrainian policy.
Putin thus gives up any idea of ever conquering Odessa and accepts the affront of abandoning Kherson, proclaimed "Russian forever" only 41 days ago. To declare untouchable Russian soil a territory that one is in fact losing as we speak is to raise the political stakes sharply with a weak military game in hand and without the excuse of not knowing the other's game. So he had to expect to lose face in proportion to the emphasis of his speech.
In an attempt to save face, this withdrawal was accompanied by a manoeuvre of justification - saving the lives of the population and its soldiers - and distraction, not in the sense of amusement but of diverting attention. The strings of distraction are now well known. The accusation, with evidence 'forthcoming', of having done or preparing something very dirty is the most classic procedure. Even if this accusation is far-fetched, it keeps the media and the public busy as long as it is terrible. It is even possible to combine justification and accusation, as when one announces that one wants to protect people (read "kidnap entire populations and loot everything that can be looted") from the Ukrainian project to destroy the Kakhovka dam. More tragically, the distraction manoeuvre may also be akin to retaliation by, for example, significantly increasing the dosage of missile and drone strikes on the population's living infrastructure. There will probably also be a manoeuvre to mitigate defeat with the idea of decoy, as in the initial offensive on Kiev (a decoy from which the Russian army never recovered), or by explaining that the enemy was fixed on this objective and suffered heavy losses. As long as the withdrawal manoeuvre is well executed, it will even be possible to turn this into a quasi-victory on the defensive against superior NATO forces.
Let's note this rather unprecedented Russian innovation consisting in announcing in advance a tactical manoeuvre on television, a withdrawal manoeuvre that is otherwise delicate to manage and whose success relies on good planning and surprise. Of course, the idea was to put the burden of the unfortunate decision on the minister and not on Vladimir Putin, who was suddenly very absent from the media, and to send the messages described above to the population. It is true that the withdrawal had already begun anyway and that there had been no surprises for a long time.
Tactically, a withdrawal under fire is not an easy manoeuvre. So far, the Russians have been quite successful in doing so, whether on a very small scale on Snake Island, from the part of Kharkiv they occupied and of course from northern Ukraine at the end of March, even if the withdrawals of the 35th and 36th Armies north-west of Kiev have sometimes turned into a rout. The clearing of the Kherson bridgehead has been prepared for weeks and many heavy assets have already been withdrawn to the other bank. We will probably see a classic braking manoeuvre, based on mined obstacles, delaying units and artillery barrages, over several dozen kilometres to the crossing points along the river. The defence could be tightened at these crossing points, in particular at Kherson, in order to cover the Dnieper crossing operations, which would undoubtedly be the most perilous phase of the manoeuvre.
In any case, this complex manoeuvre will constitute a 'crash test' of the Russian army's solidity. If the withdrawal is orderly, without too many losses and abandonment of equipment, it will show that a Russian army in withdrawal can carry out complex manoeuvres and retain its cohesion. If not, and if there is some form of disorderly flight, massive capture of equipment or, worse, of many fighters as in the breakthrough in Kharkiv province, the blow to morale and even to potential will be very strong.
The Ukrainian forces, whose mode of action of the large-scale siege is validated, will logically have incited to exert the maximum pressure on the Russians in retreat in order to try to transform the good order into a stampede. However, on the attacker's side, this is also a delicate manoeuvre that requires exposure and can be costly in the face of a less than skilful opponent. In the aforementioned retreats around Kiev, the Ukrainians were rather cautious in their pursuit, and this will undoubtedly be the case in the Kherson region. If they can, they should infiltrate the city and rely on the internal resistance to facilitate the arrival of the manoeuvre brigades, presumably the 28th mechanised brigade first.
It is with this harassment alone that the buzzword of the moment, "trap", can only have meaning beyond the disaster scenarios of floods, dirty bombs or even the use of nuclear weapons that are being bandied about. The fierce defence of the city by the Russians, in the style of "Stalingrad on the Dnieper", no longer seems relevant. In any case, it was a quasi-suicidal mission and in reality a trap for the Russians leaning against the river. The Ukrainians did try at Severodonetsk before quickly giving up.
One can also imagine the excessive bombardment of Kherson by the Russians once it is occupied by Ukrainian forces. We will pass over the fact that it would be a question of ravaging a city declared Russian by the Russians, to consider the uselessness of the thing. A city is the place where you are best protected from artillery. You have to fire hundreds of shells to hope to kill a man. Artillery can break positions or equipment spotted with precision, in the context of counter-battery for example, it can kill men en masse in the open, but for the rest its role is to neutralise if possible in coordination with ground manoeuvres, otherwise it offers only limited interest. Temporarily neutralizing enemy troops, forcing them to hide and protect themselves, is only of interest if it is accompanied by a manoeuvre. In short, yes there will be Russian shells falling on Kherson and the surrounding area, perhaps even air strikes. This will result in a long battle of fire where Ukrainian artillery, now free to move closer to the Dnieper River, will be able to strike with HIMARS over much of the Russian-occupied south and right up to the edge of Crimea.
It is likely, however, that the manoeuvres will stop there. While it may be interesting to leave the threat of a forceful crossing hanging in the air, one must understand the difficulty of the exercise which, with the width of the river, would be similar to a large-scale amphibious landing operation. At the limit, a real amphibious operation to approach the south of Kherson through the Dniprovska Gulf and the advanced point of the Heroiske natural park would perhaps be easier. In any case, it would require a lot of effort and risk-taking to create a fragile bridgehead. In reality, the situation that the Russians experienced is reversed.
It is much more useful, on both sides, to move forces elsewhere. Fourteen Ukrainian brigades, roughly one-fifth of the available combat units, are currently concentrated around the bridgehead. Four or five, especially territorial national guard units to hold the left bank of the Dnieper. The eight manoeuvre brigades, on the other hand, after replenishment and rest, represent a major resource that can be decisive in another respect. General Surovikin obviously made the same point with what would remain of the forces of the 49th Army and the 22nd Corps once the crossing was completed. The 5th Army, already present on the left bank, can hold the line and what will be left of the withdrawn forces, which are fewer in number and in worse condition than the Ukrainian forces, can also be deployed elsewhere.
If we broaden the scope, on this 11 November the war is still going on in the manner of 1918. The Ukrainians' operational strategy is still to hammer the front with 10-15 brigade offensives and 'privateer operations' until, at best, the Russian army collapses under the blows or, at worst, the enemy is gradually driven out of all the territory it occupies during 2023. The Ukrainian strategic horizon ends here, with the prospect of a frozen conflict on the Russian-Ukrainian border or the acceptance of defeat by Russia through a peace treaty.
On the Russian side, a general defensive posture is being played on the front with three lines of effort that are hoped to turn the tide: pressuring the Ukrainian population with the "energy campaign" to put pressure on their government, influencing Western public opinion to stop supporting Ukraine, and finally transforming the Russian army sufficiently through partial mobilisation to break the Ukrainian momentum. At this stage, preserving the gains of the conquests would probably be considered by the Russians as an acceptable victory.
In the confrontation of these strategies, everything is a matter of economy of forces. And this is where the transfer of the Kherson manoeuvre brigades can have a strategic effect, either by being engaged in another battle or by rotating with brigades in cover to the north that would be engaged. The major challenge was for the Ukrainians to maintain their superiority in numbers of tactically sound combat units and thereby multiply their victories in the shortest possible time. It took the Allies twelve successful offensives from July to November 1918 to completely break both the German army and accelerate political change in Germany. It would take fewer, perhaps five or six, to break the Russian army, if possible before the 200,000 men being prepared in Russia arrived.
Taking the victory at Kherson for granted, the Ukrainians had won two in three months. There would still be three or four major battles to be won between now and the spring, in any location, provided that they could break the Russian army. As in November 1918, there would not even be any need to penetrate the territory to obtain victory. Alsace-Lorraine was not liberated by conquest but by the collapse of the German army. In this context, organic strategy was as important as operational strategy. The one who makes the best use of his forces wins, but so does the one who is best able to create, train, reconstitute and transform his forces into, for example, an "alpine army" for the winter. The five Ukrainian victories to come in the next six months are now being forged in the rear.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Update of the situation on 11 November 2022
The Russian command has just announced the withdrawal of all its forces to the left of the Dnieper. More precisely, Vladimir Putin accepted the proposal, which must have been quite old, of his generals to withdraw the 49th Army and the 22nd Army Corps from this untenable position. Perhaps he was thoughtful enough to wait until after the US elections so as not to offer an indirect victory to Joe Biden's Ukrainian policy.
Putin thus gives up any idea of ever conquering Odessa and accepts the affront of abandoning Kherson, proclaimed "Russian forever" only 41 days ago. To declare untouchable Russian soil a territory that one is in fact losing as we speak is to raise the political stakes sharply with a weak military game in hand and without the excuse of not knowing the other's game. So he had to expect to lose face in proportion to the emphasis of his speech.
In an attempt to save face, this withdrawal was accompanied by a manoeuvre of justification - saving the lives of the population and its soldiers - and distraction, not in the sense of amusement but of diverting attention. The strings of distraction are now well known. The accusation, with evidence 'forthcoming', of having done or preparing something very dirty is the most classic procedure. Even if this accusation is far-fetched, it keeps the media and the public busy as long as it is terrible. It is even possible to combine justification and accusation, as when one announces that one wants to protect people (read "kidnap entire populations and loot everything that can be looted") from the Ukrainian project to destroy the Kakhovka dam. More tragically, the distraction manoeuvre may also be akin to retaliation by, for example, significantly increasing the dosage of missile and drone strikes on the population's living infrastructure. There will probably also be a manoeuvre to mitigate defeat with the idea of decoy, as in the initial offensive on Kiev (a decoy from which the Russian army never recovered), or by explaining that the enemy was fixed on this objective and suffered heavy losses. As long as the withdrawal manoeuvre is well executed, it will even be possible to turn this into a quasi-victory on the defensive against superior NATO forces.
Let's note this rather unprecedented Russian innovation consisting in announcing in advance a tactical manoeuvre on television, a withdrawal manoeuvre that is otherwise delicate to manage and whose success relies on good planning and surprise. Of course, the idea was to put the burden of the unfortunate decision on the minister and not on Vladimir Putin, who was suddenly very absent from the media, and to send the messages described above to the population. It is true that the withdrawal had already begun anyway and that there had been no surprises for a long time.
Tactically, a withdrawal under fire is not an easy manoeuvre. So far, the Russians have been quite successful in doing so, whether on a very small scale on Snake Island, from the part of Kharkiv they occupied and of course from northern Ukraine at the end of March, even if the withdrawals of the 35th and 36th Armies north-west of Kiev have sometimes turned into a rout. The clearing of the Kherson bridgehead has been prepared for weeks and many heavy assets have already been withdrawn to the other bank. We will probably see a classic braking manoeuvre, based on mined obstacles, delaying units and artillery barrages, over several dozen kilometres to the crossing points along the river. The defence could be tightened at these crossing points, in particular at Kherson, in order to cover the Dnieper crossing operations, which would undoubtedly be the most perilous phase of the manoeuvre.
In any case, this complex manoeuvre will constitute a 'crash test' of the Russian army's solidity. If the withdrawal is orderly, without too many losses and abandonment of equipment, it will show that a Russian army in withdrawal can carry out complex manoeuvres and retain its cohesion. If not, and if there is some form of disorderly flight, massive capture of equipment or, worse, of many fighters as in the breakthrough in Kharkiv province, the blow to morale and even to potential will be very strong.
The Ukrainian forces, whose mode of action of the large-scale siege is validated, will logically have incited to exert the maximum pressure on the Russians in retreat in order to try to transform the good order into a stampede. However, on the attacker's side, this is also a delicate manoeuvre that requires exposure and can be costly in the face of a less than skilful opponent. In the aforementioned retreats around Kiev, the Ukrainians were rather cautious in their pursuit, and this will undoubtedly be the case in the Kherson region. If they can, they should infiltrate the city and rely on the internal resistance to facilitate the arrival of the manoeuvre brigades, presumably the 28th mechanised brigade first.
It is with this harassment alone that the buzzword of the moment, "trap", can only have meaning beyond the disaster scenarios of floods, dirty bombs or even the use of nuclear weapons that are being bandied about. The fierce defence of the city by the Russians, in the style of "Stalingrad on the Dnieper", no longer seems relevant. In any case, it was a quasi-suicidal mission and in reality a trap for the Russians leaning against the river. The Ukrainians did try at Severodonetsk before quickly giving up.
One can also imagine the excessive bombardment of Kherson by the Russians once it is occupied by Ukrainian forces. We will pass over the fact that it would be a question of ravaging a city declared Russian by the Russians, to consider the uselessness of the thing. A city is the place where you are best protected from artillery. You have to fire hundreds of shells to hope to kill a man. Artillery can break positions or equipment spotted with precision, in the context of counter-battery for example, it can kill men en masse in the open, but for the rest its role is to neutralise if possible in coordination with ground manoeuvres, otherwise it offers only limited interest. Temporarily neutralizing enemy troops, forcing them to hide and protect themselves, is only of interest if it is accompanied by a manoeuvre. In short, yes there will be Russian shells falling on Kherson and the surrounding area, perhaps even air strikes. This will result in a long battle of fire where Ukrainian artillery, now free to move closer to the Dnieper River, will be able to strike with HIMARS over much of the Russian-occupied south and right up to the edge of Crimea.
It is likely, however, that the manoeuvres will stop there. While it may be interesting to leave the threat of a forceful crossing hanging in the air, one must understand the difficulty of the exercise which, with the width of the river, would be similar to a large-scale amphibious landing operation. At the limit, a real amphibious operation to approach the south of Kherson through the Dniprovska Gulf and the advanced point of the Heroiske natural park would perhaps be easier. In any case, it would require a lot of effort and risk-taking to create a fragile bridgehead. In reality, the situation that the Russians experienced is reversed.
It is much more useful, on both sides, to move forces elsewhere. Fourteen Ukrainian brigades, roughly one-fifth of the available combat units, are currently concentrated around the bridgehead. Four or five, especially territorial national guard units to hold the left bank of the Dnieper. The eight manoeuvre brigades, on the other hand, after replenishment and rest, represent a major resource that can be decisive in another respect. General Surovikin obviously made the same point with what would remain of the forces of the 49th Army and the 22nd Corps once the crossing was completed. The 5th Army, already present on the left bank, can hold the line and what will be left of the withdrawn forces, which are fewer in number and in worse condition than the Ukrainian forces, can also be deployed elsewhere.
If we broaden the scope, on this 11 November the war is still going on in the manner of 1918. The Ukrainians' operational strategy is still to hammer the front with 10-15 brigade offensives and 'privateer operations' until, at best, the Russian army collapses under the blows or, at worst, the enemy is gradually driven out of all the territory it occupies during 2023. The Ukrainian strategic horizon ends here, with the prospect of a frozen conflict on the Russian-Ukrainian border or the acceptance of defeat by Russia through a peace treaty.
On the Russian side, a general defensive posture is being played on the front with three lines of effort that are hoped to turn the tide: pressuring the Ukrainian population with the "energy campaign" to put pressure on their government, influencing Western public opinion to stop supporting Ukraine, and finally transforming the Russian army sufficiently through partial mobilisation to break the Ukrainian momentum. At this stage, preserving the gains of the conquests would probably be considered by the Russians as an acceptable victory.
In the confrontation of these strategies, everything is a matter of economy of forces. And this is where the transfer of the Kherson manoeuvre brigades can have a strategic effect, either by being engaged in another battle or by rotating with brigades in cover to the north that would be engaged. The major challenge was for the Ukrainians to maintain their superiority in numbers of tactically sound combat units and thereby multiply their victories in the shortest possible time. It took the Allies twelve successful offensives from July to November 1918 to completely break both the German army and accelerate political change in Germany. It would take fewer, perhaps five or six, to break the Russian army, if possible before the 200,000 men being prepared in Russia arrived.
Taking the victory at Kherson for granted, the Ukrainians had won two in three months. There would still be three or four major battles to be won between now and the spring, in any location, provided that they could break the Russian army. As in November 1918, there would not even be any need to penetrate the territory to obtain victory. Alsace-Lorraine was not liberated by conquest but by the collapse of the German army. In this context, organic strategy was as important as operational strategy. The one who makes the best use of his forces wins, but so does the one who is best able to create, train, reconstitute and transform his forces into, for example, an "alpine army" for the winter. The five Ukrainian victories to come in the next six months are now being forged in the rear.
I think that this estimate comes from someone very well informed and that it does not seek to feed propaganda
Ukraine live briefing: Ukrainian troops advance on Kherson with caution; U.S. to send more air defenses
This means that in 10 months the Russians lost more than 4x times the number of troops they lost over a 10-year period in the Soviet-Afghan war.
There are no words to describe what a colossal screw-up this has been for Russia.
100,000 is the number of dead and wounded, we can assume that there are 1/3 dead and 2/3 wounded.
1,00,000 same as Ukranian.
Yes I read his statement earlier today.
US plans to buy 100,000 rounds of artillery ammo from South Korea for Ukraine | CNN Politics
The US intends to buy 100,000 rounds of artillery ammunition from South Korean arms manufacturers to provide to Ukraine, a US official said, as part of a broader effort to find available weaponry for the high-intensity battles unfolding in Ukraine.
he will say western imperialism was 500 years ago and they have not invaded any country.I didn't know 1941 was 210 years ago.